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Aim of this Master’ s thesis 
 
The main objective of this Master’ s thesis is to test whether the degree of (un)sustainability 
of a firm could be associated to a new risk factor that would explain asset returns in addition 
to the traditional three factors of the Fama-French asset pricing model. 
More precisely, I am going to analyze if, once we take into account market, size and value risks 
when pricing stocks, there is indeed a statistically significant risk premium associated to an 
extra ESG1 factor.  
The core hypothesis we will test can therefore be summarized as: 
“The risk exposure to an ESG-related factor added to the classical Fama-French model is 
significantly different from zero”. 
Globally, it is generally assumed that shareholders are willing to accept lower returns if 
companies have good sustainable scores [e.g., Sharfman and Fernando (2008); El Ghoul et al 
(2011); Chava (2011); Reverte (2011); Dhaliwal et al (2011); and Barth et al (2013)]. Indeed, 
in that case, firms would be considered by these persons as more suited to future 
development prospects and they would therefore be considered as less risky for the coming 
years [e.g., Sharfman and Fernando (2008); Lee and Faff (2009); Oikonomou et al (2012); and 
Sassen et al (2016)]. In the risk-return framework, the notion that sustainable leaders are less 
risky investments than laggards implies that investors demand a lower return on sustainable 
firms’ stocks (Guenster et al (2011)).  
To verify the statistical viability of the assumption at the heart of this Master’ s thesis, I will 
proceed step by step by first making peripheral analyses and then by explicitly creating an ESG 
factor. Such that, we will be able to largely browse the impact of firms’ ESG commitment on 
their cost of equity.  
More precisely, I will first investigate the potential correlation existing between returns and 
ESG criteria. This will give us a first insight into the intuition that companies with poor ESG 
performance would be associated with higher returns.  
Then, I will investigate the potential effect of sustainability on market-risk betas extracting 
either from the CAPM or the Fama-French three-factor model. This step will highlight the 
potential impact ESG scores have on the non-diversifiable and oldest risk factor; that is, the 
                                                          
1 Environmental, Social, Governance. 
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market one. It could in fact be assumed that ESG criteria have an influence on the famous 
“Beta” [e.g., Ashbaugh et al (2004); Derwall and Verwijmeren (2007); Salama et al (2011) 
Oikonomou et al (2012); and Albuquerque et al (2018)]. In that case, sustainability would have 
the potential to change the relationship existing between returns and renowned systematic 
risk factor.  
Next, I will analyze the impact of sustainability on risk-adjusted returns [e.g., Gompers et al 
(2003); Derwall et al (2005); Derwall et al (2011); Eccles et al (2013); and Edmans et al (2014)] 
using again the two best known and used pricing models. If ESG criteria prove to have an 
impact on the alphas, it might especially suggest that there is a missing sustainable risk factor 
in the aforementioned asset pricing models (Lee and Faff (2009)).  
Finally, I am going to build an ESG factor defined as the difference in returns between firms 
with the worst ESG scores less firms with the best ESG scores and to add it to the three 
common risk factors of Fama and French [e.g., Koch and Bassen (2012); Girerd-Potin et al 
(2014); Jin (2017); Hübel and Scholz (2019); and Görgen et al (2019)]. If our initial intuition is 
corroborated, we expect a positive and statistically significant risk premium associated to this 
new factor for low ESG companies [e.g., Ashbaugh et al (2004); Girerd-Potin et al (2014); and 
Jin (2017)].  
Regarding the thread of this Master’ s thesis, I will first introduce the concept of Responsible 
Investment (RI). Then, we will move to the literature review mainly outlining the links between 
firms’ cost of capital/performance and sustainability. Afterward, we will turn to a brief 
description of data and pricing models we are going to use latter on when performing 
statistical and econometric manipulations. Next, I will expose my research methodology and 
we will discuss findings. Finally, I will highlight the conclusion inherent in this Master ‘s thesis.  
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Background 
 
Sustainability has without a doubt been one of the most significant trends in financial markets 
for decades. Whether in the form of investors’ desire for responsible investing (RI), or 
corporate management’s focus on corporate social responsibility (CSR), the content, focusing 
on sustainability and ESG (environmental, social and governance) issues, is the same.  
The growth of the UN Global Compact2, the United Nations backed Principles for Responsible 
Investment (UN PRI)3, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)4, the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP)5, the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB)6, the American7 and European8 
SRI markets and the fact that sustainable investing assets in the five9 major markets stood at 
$30.7 trillion at the start of 201810, all bear strong testament to sustainability concerns.  
                                         
What is precisely responsible investment? 
 
Responsible investment is broadly defined as an investment process that involves identifying  
firms with high CSR profiles where the latter are evaluated on the basis of environmental, 
social and corporate governance criteria.  
RI is therefore an approach to investing that explicitly acknowledges the relevance to the 
investor of ESG factors, and of the long-term health and stability of the market as a whole.  
It admits that the generation of long-term sustainable returns is dependent on stable, well- 
functioning and well-governed social, environmental and economic systems.11  
Responsible investment can be differentiated from conventional approaches to investment in 
two main ways. The first is the timeframe; the goal is the creation of long-term investment 
returns that are sustainable rather than just short-term returns. The second is that responsible 
investment requires that investors pay attention to the wider contextual factors, including the 
stability and health of economic and environmental systems and the evolving values and 
expectations of the firms of which they are part. 
                                                          
2 For more information on the UN Global Compact, see: www.unglobalcompact.org and/or consult Appendix 1. 
3 Background information on the United Nations backed Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI), see: www.unpri.org and/or consult 
Appendix 1.  
4 Consult Appendix 1 and see Global Reporting Initiative’s website for further information: www.gri.org. 
5 For more information on Carbon Disclosure Project, see: www.cdp.net and/or consult Appendix 1. 
6 Know more about SASB on www.sasb.org and/or consult Appendix 1.  
7 US SIF (www.ussif.org).  
8 Eurosif (more information available in Appendix 1 and on www.eurosif.org). 
9 Europe, United States, Japan, Canada and Australia/New Zealand.  
10 Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (GSIA) (2018). 
11 Definition extracted and then adapted thanks to a 2016 UN PRI rapport available on: https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=1398.  
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In short, it can be said that responsible investment is an investment strategy which attempts 
to generate both financial and sustainable value.  
It consists of a set of investment approaches that integrate environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) as well as ethical issues into financial analysis and decision-making. 
 
What are the main different responsible investment strategies? 
 
Responsible investment encompasses a number of investment approaches, but it can be 
categorized into two broad strategies12. 
One is ESG incorporation, which considers environmental, community, other societal or 
corporate governance (ESG) criteria in investment analysis and portfolio construction.  
ESG incorporation can be accomplished in various ways: 
• Positive screening 
o It implies the active inclusion of corporations within an investment universe 
because of the social or environmental benefits of their products and/or processes.  
o For example, all water firms may be included in a universe on account of the social 
benefits of clean water supply and the environmental benefits of wastewater 
treatment. 
• Best-in-class 
o It is a comparative investment style that involves investing only in companies that 
lead their peer groups in respect of environmental and social performance. 
o Under this approach, solely a proportion of water companies may be included 
within an investment universe as only a proportion can be “the best”. 
• Ethical negative screening13 
o This is where a company's activities are compared against a list of negative 
practices.  
If they are involved in too many, they will not be considered acceptable candidates 
for ethical investment.  
o It refers so to the screening of companies on moral, ethical or religious grounds 
                                                          
12 Section mainly developed thanks to US SIF’s website: https://www.ussif.org/misperceptions and to the SRI CONNECT’s site: www.sri-
coonect.com. Some information have also been collected on: http://www.nylinvestments.com/public_files/SRI/pdf/Candriam-GSIA-
Definitions.pdf. 
13 Definition developed thanks to THE GUARDIAN’s site: https://www.theguardian.com/money/2001/nov/11/ethicalmoney.  
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such as lending at interest, contraception, or animal testing. 
• Environmental/social negative screening 
o It relates to the removal of firms or sectors from an investment universe for falling 
short of any absolute environmental, social or economic standards.  
o Such screening may remove corporations exposed to activities such as nuclear 
power, pornography or tobacco manufacture. 
▪ Norms-based screening is a sub-category of environmental/social negative 
screening. It refers to the screening of investments according to their compliance  
with international standards and norms14 such as the UN Global Compact, the 
Kyoto Protocol, the UN Declaration of Human Rights etc. 
• ESG integration 
o It refers to the systematic and explicit inclusion by asset managers of ESG factors 
into financial analysis. 
• Impact investing 
o Impact investments are investments realized with the intention to generate 
positive, measurable social and environmental impact alongside a financial 
return.15 
o For instance, Revolution Foods intends to alter the system of childhood nutrition 
in the United States by providing healthy, nutritious school lunches in public and 
charter schools. 
o Another example is Springboard Education which provides after-school 
educational enrichment programs to 3,000 students at 50 public and charter 
schools in 11 states in the United States. 
o Finally, let us take the example of BrightPower which provides comprehensive 
energy efficiency audits and heating and lighting retrofits for multi-tenant 
affordable housing in the New York metropolitan area.16 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Definition refines thanks to the following EUROSIF’s website: www.eurosif.org/responsible-investment-strategies/. 
15 See namely the GIIN’s site (https://thegiin.org/impact-investing/need-to-know/) for more information.   
16 Examples extracted from a paper of the Harvard Business Review (https://hbr.org/2016/01/making-sense-of-the-many-kinds-of-impact-
investing).   
8 
 
•  Sustainability-themed investing  
o The selection of assets specifically related to sustainability in single-or multi- 
themed funds. 
o Thematic funds focus on corporations that are active in sectors that favor the 
sustainable development of renewable energies, water, medicine, or more 
generally, deal with climate change, energy efficiency, health or the aging 
population. 
•   Community investing 
o It involves the provision of capital and financial services to communities that are 
underserved by traditional financial services and particularly to low-income 
individuals, small businesses and community services such as childcare, affordable 
housing, and healthcare. 
Shareowner engagement is the other principal approach to RI.  
It involves the actions sustainable investors take as asset owners to communicate to the 
managements of portfolio companies their concerns about the companies’ ESG policies and 
to ask management to study these issues and make improvements.  
Investors can directly communicate with corporate management or through investor 
networks.  
For owners of shares in publicly traded firms, shareholder engagement can take the form of 
filing or co-filing shareholder resolutions on ESG issues and conscientiously voting their shares 
on ESG issues that are raised at the companies’ annual meetings. 
According to the US SIF Foundation’s 2016 report17 on US Sustainable, Responsible and Impact 
Investing Trends18, the total US-domiciled assets under management using RI strategies grew 
from $6.57 trillion at the start of 2014 to $8.72 trillion at the start of 2016, an increase of 33 
percent, as illustrated in Figure A.  
In 2016, these assets accounted for more than one out of every five dollars under professional 
management in the United States. 
 
 
                                                          
17 Available on the following link: https://www.ussif.org/files/SIF_Trends_16_Executive_Summary(1).pdf. 
18 The Trends Report - first compiled in 1995 - is the most comprehensive study of sustainable and impact investing in the United States. 
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Figure A : Evolution of the two strategies linked to RI between 1995 and 201819 
 
 
Indeed, the assets engaged in sustainable, responsible and impact investing practices at the 
start of 2016 represented nearly 22 percent of the $40.3 trillion in total assets under 
management tracked by Cerulli Associates20.  
By looking at the US SIF Foundation’s 2018 Report21 on US Sustainable, Responsible and Impact 
Investing Trends, sustainable, responsible and impact investing assets accounted for $12.0 
trillion - or one in four dollars - of the $46.6 trillion in total assets under professional 
management in the United States at that time.  
This represents a 38 percent increase over 2016.   
Since the first report when assets totaled just $639 billion to 2018, the sustainable and 
responsible investing industry has grown 18-fold. 
          
A quick overview of the evolution of responsible investment22 
 
Ethical investing dates back to 1500. This included values-based investors who wished to 
screen out specific investments that were not compatible with their missions and goals. Those 
exclusionary screens often included so-called “sin” stocks like alcohol, tobacco, gun makers or 
casinos. Here, investors were prepared to give up on risk-adjusted returns in order to align 
                                                          
19 Source: US SIF Foundation. 
20 Cerulli Associates is a research firm that specializes in worldwide asset management and distribution analytics and guidance. 
21 Available on the following link: 
https://www.ussif.org/files/US%20SIF%20Trends%20Report%202018%20Release.pdf. 
22 For deeper information see the Deutsche Bank study from 2012 available on www.db.com/cr/en/docs/Sustainable_Investing_2012.pdf. 
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their investments with their ethical values.  
Then, we saw the emergence of a second wave of positive screening. This approach 
incorporates ESG themes into investment decisions by way of tilting a portfolio toward firms 
with the ESG attributes investors wanted exposure to. The goal is to deploy capital to create 
and reinforce positive impact and, in most cases, this also implies the aim of achieving market- 
like returns.  
The third and most recent evolution involves harnessing ESG information and integrating it 
into the investment process and risk and framework to improve the investment outcomes - 
either in terms of generating incremental return or better managing risk. Investors’ desire for 
improved risk/return outcomes drove focus to this type of investing. 
                                                             
What does ESG stand for? 
 
This term is an international acronym used by the financial community to designate the 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria which are usually the three pillars of the 
extra-financial analysis. 
ESG criteria are in fact analytical criteria used to assess the consideration of sustainable 
development and long-term issues in corporate strategy. 
The environmental criterion looks at how a firm performs as a steward of nature.  
The social criterion examines how a corporation manages relationships with its employees, 
suppliers, customers and the communities where it operates.  
The third and last criterion, which is linked to governance, deals with a company’s leadership, 
executive pay, audits, internal controls and shareholder rights. 
Environmental, social and governance criteria are essentially used as a framework by 
responsible investors to screen investments or assess risks in investment decision-making. 
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What exactly does each of the three criteria refer to23? 
 
After having given a global and formal definition of what ESG criteria are, it is now time to 
analyze more specifically each criterion and, simultaneously, to highlight some specific 
examples of how companies can act on those factors.  
❖ Environmental factors 
Environmental factors are about a company’s impact on the environment.  
They are based on the premise that business activities have the potential to create 
environmental risks for ecosystems, water, air, land and human health.  
The respect of the E pillar encompasses the following acts in particular: 
▪ Using energy efficiently; 
▪ Using renewable energies that emit fewer GHG24, are less polluting, and contribute less to 
climate change; 
▪ Managing waste responsibly and so, avoiding inappropriate disposal or handling of waste; 
▪ Having responsible practices across the value chain such as no deforestation policies, no 
contamination of groundwater, forests, rivers, or seas policies or even animal welfare 
policies; 
▪ Disclosing information on all environmental policies. 
Environmental positive outcomes include avoiding or minimizing environmental liabilities, 
lowering costs and increasing profitability through energy and other efficiencies, and reducing  
regulatory, litigation and reputational risk. 
❖ Social factors 
Social factors have to do with the way businesses treat and value people.  
In other words, it is about the impact that companies can have on their employees and on 
society.  
What do have companies to put in place to respect the S pillar? 
                                                          
23 For more information on ESG definition, principles and examples, see namely the E-CSR’s site (https://e-csr.net/definitions/esg-what-is-
it-definition-principles-and-examples/) and SustainabilityHQ’s website.  
(https://www.sustainabilityhq.com/esg-matters/esg-factors-master-lists-categories/). 
24 Greenhouse gas.  
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▪ Diversity and inclusion policies to ensure no social discrimination25; 
▪ No discrimination in employment (which is social discrimination against employees); 
▪ Safe and healthy working conditions for employees; 
▪ Labor standards across supply chains that guarantee fair wages and human rights 
protection; 
▪ Good relations with local communities who give social license for companies to operate; 
▪ A commitment to ensure product safety and data protection; 
▪ A mission having the potential to create social opportunities (access to capital, healthcare, 
the internet and/or nutritious food)26; 
▪ A commitment to ensure no child labor (which also includes child prostitution, 
pornography, and trafficking) as well as no forced labor (such as bonded labor, prison 
labor, exploitative practices, restrictions on freedom of movement, or withholding of 
wages); 
▪ No local participation issue which arises when local communities or individuals are not 
consulted about the firm’s activities or when they do not benefit appropriately, and when 
critics are silenced by unethical tactics;  
▪ Companies also need to report information on what they’re doing in this area. 
Social positive outcomes under this pillar include, for instance, increasing productivity and 
morale, reducing turnover and absenteeism and improving brand loyalty. 
❖ Governance factors 
Governance factors focus on corporate policies and how companies are governed.  
It is about making the responsibilities, rights, and expectations of stakeholders clear so that 
interests are met and a consensus on a company’s long-term strategy is achieved.  
Examples of specific factors under which governance is analyzed can be: 
▪ Tax evasion, such as not paying taxes by illegal means, but also the use of tax havens; 
▪ Tax optimization, which is a non-illegal practices of minimizing tax liability;  
▪ Fraud, which corresponds to intentional deception made for personal gain or damage to 
                                                          
25 Social discrimination refers to treating people differently because of certain characteristics, such as gender, racial, ethnic, or religious. 
26 For instance, companies that develop medical treatments for undertreated conditions or for diseases that are prevalent in developing 
countries could score well in this category.  
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another individual, including counterfeiting, false advertising, misleading investors, or 
stock price manipulations; 
▪ Corporate risk management; 
▪ Executive compensation issues such as excessive salaries or bonuses; 
▪ Donations and political lobbying; 
▪ Corruption, bribery, extortion and money laundering; 
▪ Board structure and brand independence; 
▪ Protection of shareholder rights and interests; 
▪ Voting procedures; 
▪ Anti-competitive practices, which are practices that prevent, reduce, or manipulate 
competition in markets, such as bid rigging, dumping, exclusive dealing, or price fixing; 
▪ Disclosure of information on these topics. 
The effects of these policies can go from aligning shareholders’ interests with management to 
avoiding unpleasant financial surprises and having a better social acceptance as a result of 
wealth being fairly distributed. 
                                 
By which providers are ESG criteria established?27 
 
Over time, it has become increasingly critical for responsible investment professionals to 
understand the ESG profile behind the assets they are managing. Consequently, the access to 
relevant, consistent, comparable, balanced and reliable ESG information has become a 
prerequisite for asset managers to take the right investment decisions. The financial services 
market has responded to this need by producing specific ESG ratings, rankings and indices. 
More and more international and domestic public (and many private) companies are now 
being evaluated and rated on their ESG performance by various third-party providers of 
reports and ratings. Importantly, a 2016 report provided by SICM28 has highlighted that, next 
after public information, third party research was the other principal way professional 
investors get ESG data. There are currently numerous ESG data providers. Some well-known  
third party ESG report and ratings providers include:  
                                                          
27 For additional information see: https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/27/esg-reports-and-ratings-what-they-are-why-they-matter/. 
28 Sustainable Insight Capital Management. Report available on: https://www.sicm.com/docs/who-rates.pdf. 
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• Bloomberg29 which, in 2009, launched Bloomberg ESG Data Service; 
• Corporate Knights30 which publishes an annual index of the Global 100 most sustainable 
corporations in the world in its Corporate Knights magazine; 
• S&P Dow Jones Indices31, one of the world’s leading index providers, and RobecoSAM, the 
investment specialist that has focused exclusively on Sustainability Investing for over 24 
years, publish each year the results of the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices (DJSI) review; 
• Institutional Shareholder Services32, which launched the ESG Index Solutions in March 
2019; 
• MSCI ESG Research33, launched in 2010, one of the largest independent providers of ESG 
ratings; 
• RepRisk34 which was founded in 1998. With over a decade of experience serving the 
world’s largest financial institutions and corporates, RepRisk is a pioneer in ESG and 
business conduct due diligence data; 
• Sustainalytics35, an independent ESG and corporate governance research, ratings and 
analysis firm supporting investors around the world with the development and 
implementation of responsible investment strategies; 
• Thomson Reuters36, whose origins go back to 1799, a Canada-UK news agency and a 
professional, financial and legal publishing company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 More information on: www.bloomberg.com/bsustainable.  
30 More information on: www.corporateknights.com.  
31 More information on: eu.spindices.com. 
32 More information on: www.issgovernance.com.  
33 More information on: www.msci.com/products/esg.  
34 More information on: www.reprisk.com. 
35 More information on: www.sustainalytics.com. 
36 More information on: www.thomsonreuters.com. 
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What is fueling the growth of responsible investment? 
                                                    
The rising interest in responsible investment is being driven by a number of factors.  
Those can be summarized as follows:     
 
• High demand for life values 
While this may be difficult to measure, it is believed that we live in an increasingly 
interconnected and interdependent world. Our lives and happiness are increasingly connected 
to the well-being of others. As our communities prosper, so do we. 
To that respect, it has been shown there is a spiritual yearning on the part of a large and 
growing segment of the population to integrate personal values into all aspects of life, 
including finance and investing.  
In 1999, for instance, in the USA, over 50 million people identified themselves as “Cultural 
Creatives”37 interested in supporting sustainable companies in all aspects of their lives. 
There is also the Millennial Generation38, also known as Generation Y, viewing finance and 
investment as powerful tools for changing the world. The Millennials39 also view ESG 
integration as an essential component of their own investments. Equally, the increase in 
female participation in the labor market has further driven sustainable pension choices. Both 
of these groups – women and Millennials – tend to invest in order to make a clear and  
measurable positive impact on society, not just to generate profit. Consequently, 
sustainability awareness is having major knock-on effects for both investors and asset 
managers alike. 
 
• Corporate scandals40 
Over time, corporate governance has attracted a great deal of public interest due to its 
apparent importance for the economic health of corporations and society in general.  
                                                          
37 “Cultural creatives” are a broad socio-cultural group that is at the forefront of social change and has been highlighted by American 
sociologist Paul Ray and American psychologist Sherry Anderson. “Cultural creatives” bring together individuals who share a global and 
"integral" vision of the world and share a set of values. The individuals making up this socio-cultural group seek, among other things, to 
encourage low dependence on industrialized consumption patterns, to seek to promote personal and spiritual development, to put the 
human person back at the heart of society, to refuse environmental degradation, especially those resulting from the exploitation of natural 
resources and to seek new solutions to personal or social problems. 
Source used: culturalcreatives.org. 
38 See: https://www.europeanceo.com/finance/millennials-and-women-key-drivers-of-socially-responsible-investment/. 
39 See: https://www.morganstanley.com/pub/content/dam/msdotcom/ideas/sustainable-signals/pdf/Sustainable_Signals_Whitepaper.pdf. 
40 See the following paper: “Corporate Governance: An Ethical Perspective” realized by Surendra Arjoon and available on 
https://sta.uwi.edu/conferences/financeconference/Conference%20Papers/Session%205/Corporate%20Governance%20-
%20An%20Ethical%20Perspective.pdf.  
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The headlines of the previous years in particular portrayed a sad story of corporate ethics (or 
lack thereof). For example, the fall of Enron in 2001 or the bankruptcy of WorldCom in 2002 
drew attention to governance “failures”.  
In addition to that, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 acted as a wake-up call to many, 
showcasing the flaws and short-termism of the financial sector.  
These multiple facts have clearly undermined investors’ confidence. 
Most of the investors are now attracted to an investment process based on research that goes 
deeper into corporate policies.  
 
• Environmental crisis41 
The main environmental challenge in today’s world is to keep the planet livable for current  
and future generations. There is increasing evidence that human activities are affecting the 
Earth system, threatening the planet’s future livability. Pollution, climate change, biodiversity 
loss, overfishing of the seas, CO2 emissions, overconsumption, destruction of the forests, rise 
of the see level, dietary choices and habits are so many points people, including investors, 
have to tackle in order to avoid a climate catastrophe in the coming years.  
With this respect, the environmental impact of businesses has also been the subject of public 
debates ever since corporate negligence repeatedly resulted in incidents with immense 
damage caused to the environment and human health. As an illustration, we can highlight the 
following incidents: the Seveso incident in 1976; the Bhopal incident in 1984; the Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster in 1986 or even the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989. To better evaluate their 
exposure to environmental risks, investors increasingly demand that firms assess and disclose 
their relative risk position to climate change. 
 
• Social shortcomings42 
Mass production in a competitive economic system has led up to long working hours, 
underpayment and child labor, first in the developed world and later relocated to the 
developing world. Human rights provide the basic social foundation for all people to lead lives  
of dignity and opportunity. Human rights norms assert the fundamental moral claim each 
human has to life’s essentials, such as water, food, healthcare, education, freedom of 
                                                          
41 For detailed information see: https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/. 
42 Information also found on the site described in footnote 41.  
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expression, political participation and personal security.   
Knowing that globally, one in nine people in the world today is undernourished, that   
783 million people live below the international poverty line of US$1.90 a day or even that 
women and girls continue to suffer discrimination and violence in every part of the world is 
sufficient to understand the multiple government, citizen and corporate actions related to 
societal issues.  
 
• Choice 
At the end of 2017, there were 234 mutual funds and exchange traded funds available for 
socially conscious investors43.That is more than the double of the number of funds offered in  
2012. This allows a broad range of choices to meet almost all investment needs and it allows 
investors to diversify to reduce their market risk. 
 
• More and better access to information44 
Investors are more informed and educated today on ESG matters. Research companies 
provide higher quality information than ever before, and better-informed investors are 
deemed to be more aware and responsible. Though there is no standardized framework for  
evaluating or methodology for measuring RI data, initiatives are advancing through 
organizations such the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) to establish industry standards on RI reporting and disclosure, to 
enable investors to make better informed investment decisions. 
 
• Pressure from competitors45  
Competitors are seeking to differentiate themselves by offering responsible investment 
services as a competitive advantage. In 2013, Accenture conducted a survey46 of 1,000 CEOs 
in 103 countries and 27 industries. They found that 80% of CEOs view sustainability as a means 
to gain competitive advantages relative to their peers. In addition to helping companies 
differentiate themselves in an already crowded marketplace, social responsibility also inspires 
innovation within corporations, thereby developing longer-term immunity and business 
                                                          
43 See: https://eu.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/05/11/millennials-socially-responsible-investing/580434002/.  
44 Argument developed thanks to the following site: https://www.crossmarkglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/The-Evolution-of-
Responsible-Investing-2017.pdf. 
45 https://hbr.org/2006/12/strategy-and-society-the-link-between-competitive-advantage-and-corporate-social-responsibility. 
46 See the UN Global Compact-Accenture CEO Study on Sustainability 2013. 
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sustainability. 
   
• Reputational risk 
The value-destroying reputational risk from issues such as climate change, pollution, working 
conditions, employee diversity, corruption and aggressive tax strategies in a world of 
globalization and social media is a big threat to the good name or standing of a business or 
entity. Firms need to be socially responsible and environmentally conscious to avoid or 
minimize reputational risk47.  
 
• Growing commitment to UNPRI / PRI  
As the implementation of responsible investing has increased, so has the number of 
signatories to the UN Principles for Responsible Investing (PRI). Between 2006 and 2018, the 
number of signatories worldwide grew from 90 to 2,22148, suggesting investor interest has 
become much more significant. PRI works with a signatory network of international asset 
owners, investment managers and service providers to put a set of six voluntary principles 
into practice. Members publicly report their responsible investment activity for these 
principles, and in doing so, openly demonstrate commitment and promote the adoption and 
implementation by others. Investors are creating integration strategies in order to “walk the 
talk” to these six commitments. 
 
• Political pressure49 
From a policy perspective, there is a desire to harness the financial weight of institutional 
investors to support global accords such as the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable 
Development Goals.50 The G20 Leaders’ Communiqué referenced the importance of green 
finance for the first time following the Hangzhou Summit of September 2016. 
 
• The financial impact of neglecting sustainability and ESG issues from a legal and 
regulatory point of view 
Clark et al (2015) show that a neglect of environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues 
 
                                                          
47 See namely https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/reputational-risk.asp. 
48 Search made on this website: https://www.unpri.org/signatories. 
49 See: http://www.oecd.org/finance/Investment-Governance-Integration-ESG-Factors.pdf. 
50 The Paris Agreement is a global climate treaty negotiated at COP21 that aims to hold further global warming below two degrees Celsius. 
The 17 Global Sustainable Development Goals set out economic, social and environmental ambitions for UN member states. 
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led to numerous and sometimes very large51 corporate fines and settlements. They show that 
the sectors which have been most affected are financial, pharmaceutical, energy, technology 
and automobile companies. 
 
• From short to long term firms’ perspective 
For investors, the framework of their investment portfolio is typically set by a peer group or 
index benchmark. This pattern has a number of negative impacts on investment markets, 
especially in driving herding and short-term thinking. While long-term investors would allow 
firms to develop sustainable development strategies that are connected with the real needs 
of their business, money managers typically pursue a short-term perspective, as they buy and 
sell at today’s market price. Managers tend so to make decisions that increase short term 
profits at the expense of long-term shareholder value (Benabou and Tirole (2010)). As an 
example, a company may be able to reduce costs temporarily by relaxing safety standards at 
the workplace or reducing expenditures for environmentally friendly technologies and 
processes. Such actions may, however, increase the risk of future lawsuits, contingent 
environmental liabilities, consumer boycotts, etc. (Heal (2005)). In order to avoid the risk of 
disruption on company performance, investment returns and market behavior, some asset 
owners adapt a longer-term investment approach considering ESG factors. As an illustration, 
Unilever announced a few years ago that the company would stop giving quarterly earnings 
guidance so that they could focus on the development of a new and more sustainable business 
model. As a result, the firm signaled to the market the types of investors it wants to own its 
shares. 
 
• Performance and cost of capital 
The last factor (but not the least) explaining the success of SRI is the increasingly high 
number of published studies focusing on the link between ESG criteria and companies’ cost 
of capital and performance.  
This argument is naturally at the heart of my Master’ s thesis and will represent the essence 
of the literature review.   
 
                                                          
51 For example, the Bank of America paid 16,650 USD MN in 2014 due to financial fraud leading up to and during the financial crisis. 
Another example is those of Anadarko, in the sector of energy, which paid 5,150 USD MN in 2014 because of fraudulent conveyance 
designed to evade environmental liabilities.  
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How can finance concretely contribute to sustainable development? 
 
Finance has usually been considered as an obstacle to a better world.  
By using finance as a means to achieve environmental, social and governance goals, we can 
however divert the planet and its economy from its current path to a world that is sustainable 
for all.  
In a nutshell, the key role of the financial system is to allocate funding to its most productive 
use. Finance can so play a leading role in allocating investment to sustainable firms and 
projects and thus especially accelerate the transition to a low carbon and more circular 
economy52. In this allocation role, finance can also assist in making strategic decisions on the 
trade-offs between sustainable goals.  
Further, investors can exert influence on the companies in which they invest. In this way, long- 
term investors can steer firms towards sustainable business practices.  
Finally, finance is good at pricing risk for valuation purposes and can thus especially help deal 
with the inherent uncertainty about environmental issues, such as the impact of carbon 
emissions on climate change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52 A circular economy is an economic system aimed at minimizing waste and making the most of resources. 
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Literature review 
 
In this part, I have tried to investigate as widely as possible, the potential relations existing 
between sustainability and firms/funds’ performance as well as the links embracing the cost 
of capital and sustainable corporations’ behavior.  
This will allow us to have an in-depth understanding of the increasingly prominent literature 
linked to sustainability.  
We will first review some papers aiming at achieving a conclusion relative to the impact of 
sustainability and fund performance. Although is it not the core of this Master’ s thesis, so 
many papers have been written on that subject that is what not possible to elude the question. 
I therefore decided to provide an overview of some of the most related papers even though 
we do not plan to analyze them in detail.  
Then, we will turn to a section dedicated to the relation existing between sustainability and 
firms’ cost of capital. We will there investigate both equity and debt costs. The latter will be 
briefly discussed while the former, being core to this Master’ s thesis, will require more 
attention. Notably, papers investigating the link between sustainability and the cost of equity 
capital justify the first peripheral analysis we made later on when investing the impact of ESG 
on market-betas. Most importantly, and as suggested by the hypothesis inherent in our study, 
this section also raises the question whether ESG firms’ profiles do influence the cost of equity 
when incorporating sustainable risk factors in traditional asset pricing models.  
Next, we will turn to the extremely discussed potential impact of sustainability on companies’ 
performance. This section is quite large simply because the majority of scientific articles are 
interested in the above question. There, we will focus on both accounting and market-based 
performance indicators. This last section justifies our second peripheral analysis, that is, the 
impact of sustainability on risk-adjusted returns.  
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Sustainability and fund performance 
 
The empirical research regarding the performance of (un)ethical funds is quite unanimous. 
Most papers indeed conclude that there is no performance’ difference between sustainable 
and unsustainable funds. 
Empirical papers have sometimes reported mixed evidence as to the existence of a statistically 
significant difference in performance between sustainable and conventional funds in U.S. 
markets. For instance, Gil-Bazo et al (2010) affirm that SRI funds had better performance than 
conventional funds, but this result only holds if SRI funds are run by management companies 
specialized in SRI. Funds run by companies not specialized in SRI appear to underperform 
conventional funds. Another example is Nofsinger and Varma (2014) who found, for their part, 
that sustainable funds outperform their conventional peers during times of crisis and 
underperform at other times.  
Nevertheless, most of the studies on U.S. mutual funds report no statistical difference in the 
performance between sustainable and conventional funds [e.g., Hamilton et al (1993); 
Statman (2000); Bello (2005); and Dolvin et al (2017)].  
Interestingly, in a paper which focus on Canada instead of the USA, Bauer et al (2007) reached 
the conclusion that “Canadian investors can allocate their money to ethical mutual funds 
without experiencing a financial penalty vis-à-vis conventional mutual funds”. As a whole, their 
results largely corroborate previous research on ethical mutual fund performance. Investing 
in sustainable mutual funds does not lead to returns that are significantly different from those 
delivered by conventional mutual funds. Schröder (2004) analyzed for his part US funds as well 
as German and Swiss funds. He reached the conclusion that “socially screened assets seem to 
have no clear disadvantage concerning their performance compared to conventional assets”. 
Bauer et al (2005) used them an international database containing German, UK and US ethical 
mutual funds. They found no evidence of significant differences in risk-adjusted returns 
between ethical and conventional funds. Another famous paper in such context is the one of 
Renneboog et al (2008) who analyzed the performance of SRI funds across the world. They 
found that SRI funds in the US, the UK, and in many continental European and Asia-Pacific 
countries underperform their domestic benchmarks. However, with the exception of few 
countries such as Japan, France and Sweden, the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds are not 
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statistically different from the performance of conventional funds. Kreander et al (2005) 
focused themselves on the performance of European funds from four countries. Their results 
also suggest that there is no difference between ethical and non-ethical funds according to 
the performance measures employed in that paper.  
Interestingly, in 2012, Rathner conducted a meta-analysis of 25 studies based on the  
performance of SRI funds relative to conventional funds. He put in light that almost 75% of 
the performance comparisons (SRI with conventional funds) do not find any significant 
performance difference. A significant out- and underperformance is virtually found to the 
same degree. 
As a whole, we observe that most of the studies of socially responsible funds do not find 
significant differences in performance between those that follow a socially responsible 
investment strategy and those that do not.  
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Sustainability and the cost of capital 
 
Here, I will first review the effects of sustainability on the cost of capital.  
A firm’s cost of capital is an important determinant of its valuation for two reasons. Firstly, the 
cost of capital is the expected rate of return demanded by a firm’s investors for investing in 
the firm. The higher the rate of return demanded by a firm’s investors for the capital they 
provide to the company, the more costly it is for a firm to finance itself. As capital is a basic 
input that the firm receives, the more costly this input is, the less likely the firm is to make a 
profit regardless of its level of revenues. Secondly, the cost of capital is the rate that investors 
use to discount a firm’s future cash flows. The higher the cost of capital, the lower the present 
value of the company’s future cash flows. Consequently, all else being equal, corporations 
with a lower cost of capital will be more highly valued than those with a higher cost of capital 
and they will therefore be more attractive to investors. Investors determine a firm’s cost of 
capital by evaluating the riskiness of its cash flows relative to other investment opportunities 
that are available to them. Broadly speaking, companies are financed through either debt or 
equity capital. Debt capital can come from private sources53 or from public sources54. In either 
case, the cost of debt is the applicable interest rate. The cost of equity is the return investors 
in the firm’s shares expect as reflected in the stock price they are willing to pay relative to 
future expected cash flows. 
The setting up of particular ESG/CSR policies has directly quantifiable effects on companies. It 
has been shown in the literature that a firm’s costs of financing are directly affected by the 
firm’s quality of its CSR policies, its social policies, its environmental management practices 
and its corporate governance structures that are in place. 
The literature on ESG/CSR issues is extensive, but far from conclusive. There is however on 
point that is generally agreed on: the positive effects of ESG/CSR on the cost of capital. Firms 
with higher ESG/CSR scores tend to be able to borrow more cheaply, have higher credit 
rankings and lower cost of capital.  
Let us first focus on the link between sustainability and the cost of debt and then, let us turn 
to the analysis of the relationship between sustainability and the cost of equity.  
                                                          
53 (e.g., banks). 
54 (The debt markets). 
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Sustainability and the cost of debt 
 
Debt is the primary means of raising long-term capital in the USA. Factors which have an 
impact on the price that debt holders charge the borrowers are therefore of primary 
importance. In this section, we will briefly explore some of the main papers aiming at 
exploring the link between the governance, environmental or social criteria and the cost of 
debt. 
Academic literature has deeply investigated the effects of corporate governance on the cost 
of debt. Most of the papers reach the conclusion that good corporate governance leads to 
reduced borrowing costs.  
It has been documented that certain governance measures have a significant impact on a 
firm’s cost of debt, for example, the degree of institutional investor ownership, the proportion 
of outside directors on the board, the disclosure quality, and the existence of antitakeover 
measures55. Researchers nearly unanimously show that good corporate governance with 
respect to the aforementioned measures significantly decreases a firm’s cost of debt.  
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) are of the first to investigate the potential link existing between 
corporate governance mechanisms and bond ratings and yields. Especially, they examined the 
effect of two main corporate governance mechanisms on bond ratings and yields: institutional 
ownership and the percentage of outside directors on corporate boards. Their results indicate 
that firms with a higher percentage of outside directors on the board and with greater 
institutional ownership enjoy lower bond yields and higher ratings on their new debt issues. 
Those results allude to a risk reduction role of shareholder governance mechanisms which are 
valued by bondholders but most likely not by shareholders. Likewise, Klock et al (2005) 
investigated the relation between anti-takeover provisions (as measured by the well-known 
GIM-index constructed by Gompers et al (2003)) and the cost of debt. They discovered that 
the cost of debt of firms with the strongest management rights (strongest anti-takeover 
provisions) was much lower than the cost of debt for firms with the strongest shareholder 
rights (weakest anti-takeover provisions). Their result suggests so that antitakeover 
governance provisions, although not beneficial to stockholders, are viewed favorably in the 
bond market. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al (2006) reached similar results with respect to the link 
                                                          
55 Anti-takeover measures are actions taken on a continual or sporadic basis by a firm's management in order to prevent or dissuade 
unwanted takeovers. 
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between credit ratings and antitakeover provisions. They showed that the number of anti- 
takeover provisions is positively related to bond ratings, implying lower bond yields for 
companies which are protected from the market for corporate control. They also shed in light 
that the higher the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, the higher the bond 
ratings. However, their results also highlight that the number of outside blockholders is 
negatively and significantly related to bond ratings. 
A bit latter, Cremers et al (2007) documented that institutional blockholdings have the 
potential to lower the yields on outstanding corporate bonds. However, this is just the case if 
and only if the firm has put in place several antitakeover measures which protect it from the 
market for corporate control. 
Similarly, but in a slightly different context, Chava et al (2009) looked at how shareholder 
rights influence the cost of the bank loans of corporations. Their results show that companies 
which have fewer antitakeover devices in place pay on average significantly higher spreads on 
bank loans. The authors especially found that banks charge a higher loan spread to 
corporations presenting higher takeover vulnerability mainly because of their concern about 
a substantial increase in financial risk after the takeover.  
Relatively to the quality of disclosure aspect, Sengupta (1998) especially showed a negative 
relation between the quality of a firm’s disclosure and its cost of debt. In the same line, Yu 
(2005) also documented that the credit spread is negatively related to the quality of 
disclosure. Disclosure is especially an important governance mechanism in the sense it 
reduces default risk by reducing information asymmetry between the company and the 
lenders.  
With respect to the environmental criterion, let us start with the paper of Bauer and Hann 
(2010). Relying on KLD scores as their main data source for CSR ratings, the authors 
documented a significant and negative relationship between good environmental 
management practices and a corporation’s loan spread. On the contrary, they indicated a 
significant and positive relationship between a company’s environmental concerns and its 
loan spread. There results therefore imply that firms which have better environmental 
management standards in place have lower loan spreads, and hence, exhibit lower costs of 
debt. In numerical terms, the authors claim that a corporate’s environmental management 
practices can have an effect of up to 64 basis points on the loan spread on an annual basis. To 
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explain such results, the authors advanced that environmental practices influence the 
solvency of borrowing companies by determining their exposure to legal, reputational and 
regulatory risks. Schneider (2011) supports that view by highlighting the fact that poor 
environmental performance presents a significant downside risk in future cleanup and 
compliance costs when considering the increasingly strict environmental laws and regulations. 
According to him, these costs can be large enough to threaten the ability of polluting 
companies to meet their fixed payments to creditors. Therefore, bond yields of firms with 
relatively poor environmental performance will be upper those of firms with good 
environmental performance. On the same year, Goss and Roberts reported that companies 
with CSR concerns pay on average between 7 and 18 basis points more on their bank loans 
than firms without CSR concerns. The authors claim that banks evaluate CSR concerns as risk 
factors and therefore offer those companies “less attractive loan contract terms”. 
Relatively to the social aspect in particular, Bauer et al (2009) demonstrated that companies 
with stronger employee relations enjoy a statistically and economically lower cost of debt 
financing, higher credit ratings, and lower firm-specific risk. Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010) 
also support the idea that a corporation’s interest in employee well-being is associated with a 
higher creditworthiness of the corporation. The lower default probability intuitively implies a 
lower cost of debt capital.  
Overall, the literature on the relation between ESG/CSR and a firm’s cost of debt is indicating 
a negative relationship between ESG/CSR quality and cost of debt. In other words, having good 
ESG/CSR scores usually leads to higher bond ratings because creditors nowadays realize that 
firms with improper ESG/CSR standards in place might be prone to particular environmental, 
social, and governance risks which could have dramatic effects on a firm’s reputation or 
financial position. Better creditworthiness then induces, generally, a lower cost of debt 
(whether in the form of lower bond spreads or loan spreads of credit facilities).  
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Sustainability and the cost of equity 
 
Papers on RI have not just concentrated on how it influences the cost of debt financing, but 
also on how the cost of equity financing is affected by CSR policies and ESG behavior. Given 
the conclusions drawn in the section relative to the cost of debt financing, one could expect 
that the risk-reduction characteristics of proper ESG/CSR standards also reduce the cost of 
equity financing. The empirical findings from the literature on ESG/CSR and the cost of equity 
generally support that idea. 
Let us so look at some famous studies investigating the relation between the governance, 
environmental or social criteria and the cost of equity. 
Over time, researchers have identified key governance attributes (namely the quality of firms’ 
financial information, the ownership structure, the stakeholder rights, or even, the board 
structure) that are intended to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection problems present 
in publicly traded firms. Since those governance attributes are intended to reduce agency risks 
faced by equity stakeholders, they should have measurable effects on firms’ cost of equity 
capital.  
By assessing the effects of governance on expected returns, on firms’ market beta, and on 
realized returns, Ashbaugh et al (2004) support the general hypothesis that firms with better 
governance present less agency risk to shareholders resulting in lower cost of equity capital. 
Firstly, the authors made in particular OLS regressions having as dependent variable the cost 
of equity56 and as independent variables, various governance attributes. From there, they 
for instance observed that firms with less transparent earnings have a higher cost of equity or 
that companies with more independent audit committees have a lower cost of equity. 
Secondly, and importantly for us, they also regressed the market betas on different 
governance attributes and concluded to that respect that the quality of firms’ governance 
reduces firms’ exposure to market risk. About that, they found, for instance, that more 
independent boards reduce management tendencies toward over-investment, thereby 
lowering the market risk faced by shareholders. Thirdly, they also decided to capture a firm’s 
overall governance risk by constructing a composite governance score. They added this 
governance factor to a classical Fama-French three-factor regression. They defined this fourth 
                                                          
56 Measured here as the average expected return over the firm’s fiscal year. 
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factor as the difference in returns between firms with the worst governance and firms with 
the best governance. The highly significant positive loading on the governance factor they 
found indicates that a portion of firms’ realized returns is due to a governance risk premium. 
This finding suggests that poor governance exposes shareholders to greater agency risk which 
is another risk factor in addition to beta, size and market-to-book that affects companies’ cost 
of equity. Governance thus seems to affect firms’ cost of equity capital directly as well as 
indirectly via beta. Derwall and Verwijmeren (2007) presented pooled regression results 
having as a dependent variable a measure of implied cost of equity and, among explanatory 
variables, usual risk factors (beta, size, etc.) as well as an aggregate corporate governance 
index. With that respect, they concluded that firms with better governance enjoy a lower cost 
of equity capital. Then, they also used betas as dependent variable in pooled OLS regressions 
and suggest that leaders in corporate governance have lower systematic risk. Interestingly, 
they also found that better governance is associated with lower firm-specific risk.  
Barth et al (2013) provided evidence that companies with more transparent earnings (thus 
having a good governance score at least to that respect), enjoy a lower cost of equity capital 
due to a reduction in information asymmetry. Their findings result from various manipulations 
with respect to the three factors of FF as well as to a momentum factor and an earning 
transparency measure.  
Some studies are not limited to the US market. Chen et al (2009) especially investigated the 
link between the cost of equity capital and corporate governance in emerging markets. They 
showed, among other things, that firm-level corporate governance significantly reduced the 
cost of equity in those markets. Pae and Choi (2011) specifically focused on the Korean stock 
market and highlighted that corporations could reduce their cost of equity capital by adopting 
more comprehensive corporate governance practices and committing to higher standards of 
business ethics.  
Let us now look at the link between the cost of equity and the environmental and social 
aspects. In 2014, El Ghoul et al reached the conclusion that firms experience lower cost of 
equity capital when they have higher corporate environmental responsibility (CER). In that 
international study, authors especially argued that the perceived risk of firms with high CER is 
lower than that of firms with low CER because CER helps decrease firms’ risk by reducing the 
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probability and impact of adverse events57. In addition, they advanced that it is possible that 
firms caring about the environment will gain more visibility and positive publicity in the media, 
thereby attracting more investors. This increase in the number of shareholders will increase 
the firm’s share price and decrease its cost of equity. Still in an international framework, Gupta 
(2015) demonstrated for her part that an improvement in environment-friendly practices 
leads to a reduction of the equity cost. The authors underlined that results are even stronger 
in countries where country-level governance is weak.  
Heinkel et al (2001) showed them that exclusionary ethical investing leads to polluting 
companies being held by a lower number of investors since green investors avoid polluting 
firms’ stocks. The lack of risk sharing among non-green investors leads to lower stock prices 
for polluting companies, thereby raising their cost of capital. Besides that, they also underlined 
that when the price differential between acceptable and non-acceptable companies grows 
large enough, it becomes optimal for unacceptable companies to pay the fixed cost of 
reforming (such that, making themselves acceptable to green investors).  
Sharfman and Fernando (2008) isolated specifically in an OLS regression the CAPM’ betas they 
estimated, and they discovered that firms with good environmental risk management faced 
lower systematic risk. As a result, those companies experience less volatility in their 
performance and the market appears to reward such behavior with lower costs of equity 
capital. In 2011, Salama et al used also CAPM’ betas as depend variable and the corporate 
environmental performance alongside seven control variables as independent variables. 
Overall, the authors found evidence of a negative relationship between CER58 ranking and 
beta. In a similar vein, Oikonomou et al. (2012) found a negative (positive) relation between 
CSP59 strengths (concerns) and systematic risk for S&P 500 firms. 
With respect to studies that globally focus on CSR and the cost of equity, Reverte (2011) made 
various regressions among which one was aimed to take the cost of equity capital as a 
dependent variable and, as independent variables, the three FF factors as well as a CSR 
reporting aggregate rating that he transformed into quintile ranks. Overall, he found a 
significant negative relationship between CSR disclosure quality scores and the cost of equity 
capital (especially for firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries). Cajias et al 
                                                          
57 For instance, environmental scandals.  
58 Community and Environmental Responsibility. 
59 Corporate Social Performance.  
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(2012) used the FF three-factor model as a measure of cost of equity and showed that firms 
included in high-CSR portfolios have the tendency to have lower capital costs in comparison 
to low-CSR companies. By regressing the cost of equity on various CSR proxies and control 
variables using pooled cross-sectional time-series regressions, El Ghoul et al (2011) found that 
firms with better CSR scores (especially those which exhibit good responsible employee 
relations, environmental policies, and product strategies) witness cheaper equity financing. 
Moreover, the authors have shown that firms involved in tobacco and nuclear power face 
higher equity financing costs. Their results are consistent with the idea that high sustainable 
companies are perceived by the market to be less risky, and exhibit lower information 
asymmetry, which leads to a reduction in the cost of equity financing.  
Albuquerque et al (2014) estimated firm systematic risk thanks to the Fama and French three- 
factor model. Using the estimated market betas as a dependent variable and their self- 
constructed composite CSR index among the explanatory variables, they run panel regressions 
and document that the level of systematic risk is statistically lower for firms with the highest 
CSR scores. This implies a reduced cost of equity financing, all else equal. A few years later, in 
2018, Albuquerque, along with partly different researchers, focused themselves on the CAPM’ 
betas found thanks to times-series regressions. They then used those betas as dependent 
variable in panel regressions. Constructing an overall CSR score, they also showed that the 
level of systematic risk is statistically significantly lower for companies with a higher CSR score. 
Dunn et al (2017) performed Barra’s GEM2L model to get, among other things, market betas. 
They also made various regressions among which one specifically had as dependent variable 
the betas and, as main explanatory variables, the ESG scores. With that respect, they 
discovered that stocks with poor ESG exposures tend to have higher betas. They also wanted 
to know which dimension of ESG drove the reduction in systematic risk. To this end, they made 
a regression having also the betas as dependent variable and the E, S and G pillars respectively 
as main independent variables. It appeared that the answer to their former question is the 
following one: the social and governance pillars. 
Sassen et al (2016) evaluated the impact of European ESG scores on three risk measures 
(systematic, idiosyncratic, and total risk). Overall, their findings suggest that a higher ESG 
performance and a higher performance regarding the social dimension in particular have the 
potential to increase firm value through lower firm risk. 
The voluntary disclosure of environmental practices further helps to reduce the cost of equity, 
32 
 
as shown by Dhaliwal et al (2011) who report that after volunteering CSR disclosures, 
companies with stronger CSR performance than that of their competitors are rewarded by a 
reduction in the equity cost of capital. In 2018, Breuer et al used an extensive international 
sample to examine the impact of CSR on equity cost under different levels of investor 
protection. The authors highlighted that in countries where investor protection is high (low), 
the cost of equity decreases (increases) when a company invests in CSR. The idea behind this 
result is that managers in countries where investors’ legal protection is low may not engage 
in CSR out of a genuine desire to be environmentally and socially responsible, but instead 
extract private benefits through CSR spending. 
Finally, let us quote the paper of Ng and Rezaee (2015) which examined both the aggregated 
and the decomposed influences of environmental, social, and governance aspects of CSR on 
equity cost. The authors found a negative relationship, which is lowest for the social 
dimension. In a previous study, Ng and Rezaee (2012) demonstrated that disclosure of 
sustainability performance reduces both debt and equity cost; statement that will 
furthermore be support by three other papers in the following point.    
Zhu (2014) considered 23 developed countries and investigated the link between corporate 
governance and the cost of capital.  In particular, she made regressions having as dependent 
variable either the cost of equity or the cost of debt, and, as independent variables, a firm’s 
governance proxy and an extensive collection of risk and control variables which are 
demonstrated to affect a firm’s cost of capital. She discovered that firms with good corporate 
governance are consistently associated with both lower cost of equity and cost of debt capital. 
To explain this result, she advanced that good corporate governance reduces insider 
expropriation and information risk, and therefore leads to lower costs of external financing. 
Chava (2011) used implied cost of capital derived from analysts’ earnings estimates and 
performed various regression’ models. She put in light that investors demand significantly 
higher expected returns on stocks excluded by environmental screens compared to firms 
without such environmental concerns. She also discovered that lenders charge a significantly 
higher interest rate on the bank loans issued to firms with these environmental concerns. 
Finally, carrying out international research on the effect of CR60 on the cost of capital, Bassen 
et al (2006) chose beta as a marked-based risk measure and credit rating as a debt risk 
                                                          
60 Corporate responsibility.  
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measure. Overall, the authors reached the conclusion that good CR-performance reduces both 
equity and debt financing costs.  
The overall evidence provided up to now by the academic literature on ESG/CSR and its 
relation to the costs of corporate finance generally alludes to a negative effect of SRI on both  
cost of debt and equity capital.  
Namely, good corporate governance standards, as well as superior corporate social and 
environmental standards lower a company’s costs of financing significantly because those 
companies tend to exhibit lower risks, arising from reputational, financial or litigation 
concerns resulting from ESG/CSR scandals or issues. 
Let us finally investigate in more detailed some additional papers specifically aiming at 
incorporating a new additional sustainable risk factor in traditional equity pricing models. 
Since the purpose of those papers is similar to the core hypothesis we will test in this Master’ 
s thesis, it is appropriate to analyze them in detail.  
In 2017, Jin published a paper whose title is straightforward; “Is ESG a systematic risk factor 
for US equity mutual funds?”. To answer that question, the author modified the Fama-French 
five-factor model and incorporated an ESG-related factor61 into it. Then, replicating the two- 
step procedure of Fama and MacBeth (1973), he estimated factor betas (loadings) of a large 
sample of funds through the time-series regression. As the next step, he estimated the reward 
earned per unit of exposure to risk factors through the cross-section regression.  
Overall, he found that average coefficient on UME-beta is positive and statistically significant 
during the sample period62. The result confirms that ERP63 should be positive for taking the 
ESG-related risk which we do not want exposure to. In other words, investors seem to be 
willing to forfeit a component of ERP for the down-side protection against the ESG-related 
risk. Hence, the conventional five factor model seems to overestimate the required rate of 
return on responsible investing by ignoring UME.  
Hübel and Scholz (2019) investigated for their part the European market to mainly know 
whether taking ESG risk into account when managing equity portfolios enables investors 
to better assess the ESG risk exposures of their portfolios solely based on the high 
                                                          
61 Called “UME”. Note that here the authors use return difference between an ESG-score weighted portfolio and an unweighted market 
portfolio as an ESG-related factor (UME: unweighted minus ESG-score weighted). 
62 April 2014 to December 2016. 
63 Equity risk premium. 
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informational content of stock returns. To this end, they constructed three different ESG risk 
factors (E, S and G) to quantify the ESG risk exposures of firms. The E factor represented the 
returns of a zero-investment portfolio with long positions in firms with low environmental 
ratings and short positions in firms with high environmental ratings. The S factor and the G 
one were constructed analogously. Thanks to this step, the author then mainly analyzed 
whether taking these factors into account significantly enhances the explanatory power of 
standard asset pricing models (CAPM, Fama and French three-factor model or the Fama and 
French five factor model augmented by Carhart’s momentum factor). The authors especially 
revealed that each of the three ESG factors contributes explanatory power. Importantly, they 
showed then that portfolios with pronounced ESG exposures show higher risks as the 
remaining stocks in the market. A large proportion of these risks can be explained by the ESG 
factors. 
Relatively to the idea of considering sustainability as a new and specific risk factor in 
traditional pricing models, Koch and Bassen (2012)’ paper as well as Görgen et al (2019)’  paper 
can also be cited. Koch and Bassen (2012) investigated, among other things, whether carbon 
risk do affect the utility-specific cost of capital. To this end, they added this risk factor to CAPM 
in order to examine if investors demand a premium for bearing carbon price risks. Overall, the 
authors especially provide evidence that high-emitting utilities bear a carbon risk premium 
which translates into higher cost of capital. Görgen et al (2019) developed also a carbon risk 
factor to measure the sensitivities of firms to stock market’s time-varying perception of risks 
arising from the transition towards a carbon-free economy. In more detailed, the authors 
bought a “Brown-Minus-Green” portfolio aiming at mimicking a factor related to carbon risk. 
They added then this carbon risk factor (BMG) in well-known Carhart’ s model. The carbon 
beta in such a case is thus a capital market-based measure of carbon risk that captures the 
sensitivity of a firm to carbon risk. Overall, the authors performed extensive tests of BMG 
which support their notion of its relative importance for explaining variation in global equity 
returns during their sample period64. 
Finally, let us shed in light the paper of Girerd-Potin et al (2014). The authors aimed to redefine 
some independent socially responsible dimensions reflecting companies’ coherent posture 
toward social issues other than the ESG classification mainly used in the literature. For this 
                                                          
64 January 2010 through December 2016. 
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purpose, they used the six sub-ratings provided by the Vigeo agency and made a principal 
components analysis over their time period under study65. Their results highlight three main 
independent socially responsible dimensions that include business66, societal67 and financial68 
stakeholders. Then they have followed Fama and French (1993)’ s methodology and 
constructed a “nonsocial” risk premium factor, called NMR (the return of low CSR companies 
minus the return of high CSR companies), for each of the three dimensions of CSR found 
earlier. As a next step, they analyzed the impact of the three SR risk premia on the return using 
an extension of the Fama-French three-factor model69. The results from this paper show that 
investors ask for an additional risk premium when they agree to hold low CSR stocks (based 
on the three factors defined previously), which is associated with low cost of equity for high 
CSR companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
65 December 2003 through November 2010. 
66 Employees, customers and suppliers.  
67 Environment and society. 
68 Stockholders and debt holders.  
69 Where RP,t is the return of portfolio P on month t, RM,t is the return of the market portfolio on month t, SMB is the return of the “Small 
minus Big size” Fama-French portfolio, HML is the return of the “High minus Low BTM” Fama-French portfolio, and NMR1, NMR2, NMR3 
are the three SR-based portfolios bought previously.  
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Sustainability and market/accounting-based indicators of corporate 
performance 
 
Understanding the relationship between sustainability and corporate performance has also 
spurred a large academic literature.  
I will also structure this overview along the different aspects of CSR and ESG in order to provide 
a complete picture on the effects of the different individual facets of SRI on corporate 
performance. 
The financial economics literature in general and the corporate finance literature in particular 
focused broadly on the relation between corporate governance quality and CFP.  
One of the most prominent examples of research on the relation between takeover exposure 
and stock-price performance is that of Gompers et al (2003) who asked themselves the 
following question; “Is there a relationship between shareholder rights and corporate 
performance?”. Using 24 unique antitakeover devices, they built a Governance Index70 as a 
proxy for the balance of power between managers and shareholders in each firm. Firms in the 
highest decile of the index are placed in the “Dictatorship portfolio71” and are referred to as 
having the “highest management power72” or the “weakest shareholder rights” while firms in 
the lowest decile of the index are placed in the “Democracy portfolio73” and are described as 
having the “lowest management power” or the “strongest shareholder rights74”.By analyzing 
the empirical relationship of this index with corporate performance, they discovered that an 
investment strategy that purchased shares in the lowest-G firms75 and sold shares in the 
highest-G firms76, earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year during the sample period. 
To achieve this result, they made the four-factor model of Carhart77 where the dependent 
variable was the monthly return difference between the Democracy and Dictatorship 
portfolios. Thus, the alpha in this estimation was the abnormal return on a zero-investment 
strategy that buys the Democracy portfolio and sells short the Dictatorship portfolio. For this 
                                                          
70 The famous “GIM index”.  
71 Characteristic of poor governance.  
72 A high value indicates stronger managerial power (less takeover pressure) and a greater potential for managerial entrenchment.  
73 Characteristic of good governance. 
74 The index construction was straightforward: for every firm, they added one point for every provision that restricts shareholder rights 
(increases managerial power). 
75 “Democracy” firms with strong shareholder rights. 
76 “Dictatorship” firms with weak shareholder rights. 
77 A model which simply adds a momentum factor to the traditional FF three-factor one. 
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specification, the alpha was about 8.5 % per year. Using the Tobin’s Q78 as a measure of firm 
value, they also discovered that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value. 
According to that study, good governance is therefore associated with higher equity returns 
and firm value. Bebchuk et al (2005) based their study “What matters in corporate 
governance?” on the one of Gompers et al (2003). However, they used only six79 provisions 
among the 24 presented in the Gompers et al’s paper to form their so called “Entrenchment 
index” and they also extended the time period80. Using exactly the same methodology as 
Gompers’one, they reached the same conclusion too. They indeed found that increases in the 
index level are associated with economically significant reductions in firm valuation as well as 
large negative abnormal returns. Cremers and Ferrell (2013) used the Governance Index of 
Gompers et al (2003)’ study but they only focused on the link between it and firm value 
through the Tobin’s Q measure. Extending furthermore the time period under study 
comparing to 81Bebchuk et al (2005) , they found that a higher G-Index is associated with lower 
firm valuation. Cremers and Nair (2005) provide similar evidence by studying the effects of 
both the takeover vulnerability and the strength of internal corporate governance mechanism. 
They measured the takeover vulnerability82 of a firm by using data on anti-takeover provisions 
adopted by a firm. Their first external governance proxy uses the index developed by GIM as 
an anti-takeover index. The authors corroborated their findings by constructing an alternative 
index of takeover protection, which focuses on only three key anti-takeover provisions. They 
also considered two different proxies for internal governance83. As a whole, the authors find 
that a portfolio that goes long in firms with high takeover vulnerability and shorts firms with 
low takeover vulnerability creates an abnormal return of 10 % to 15% annually, depending on 
which proxy is used for internal governance. This result, however, only holds when internal 
governance is also strong, that is, only if public pension fund (blockholder) ownership is high 
as well. In 2006, Brown and Caylor used data from ISS to build their own firm-specific 
governance index (Gov-Score). As in the case of Cremers and Nair (2005), they investigated 
both internal and external governance factors. Overall, their summary governance measure is 
                                                          
78 Note that the Tobin’s Q equals the market value of a company divided by its assets' replacement cost. 
79 4 constitutional provisions that prevent a majority of shareholders from having their way (e.g., staggered boards, limits to shareholder 
bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments), and 2 takeover-
readiness provisions that boards establish to be ready for a hostile takeover (i.e., poison pills and golden parachutes). 
80 Gompers et al (2003) focused on the 1990-1998 time period and Bebchuk et al (2005) on the 1990-2003 time period.  
81 They focused themselves indeed on the 1978-2006 period.  
82 (External governance). 
83 The percentage share ownership by institutional blockholders, defined to be an institutional shareholder with equity ownership greater 
than 5%, and the percentage of share ownership by public pension funds - who tend to be active shareholders. 
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significantly and positively related to firm valuation. Their results document so that effective 
corporate governance requires both internal and external measures, enhancing the validity of 
the Cremers and Nair (2005) findings. Still in the same vein as Gompers et al (2003), Core et al 
(2006) show that companies with more anti-takeover devices in place (i.e.: fewer shareholder 
rights as measured by the GIM index) display lower ROA84. 
In support to the results reviewed thus far, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) found that firms with 
staggered boards85 suffer in terms of lower valuations (measured by Tobin’s Q). The 
importance of the board of directors is also underlined by Yermack (1996) who proved that 
more properly governed firms (i.e. smaller boards) perform better. Using again Tobin's Q as 
an approximation of market valuation, the author thus found an inverse association between 
board size and firm value.  
There is also research showing that the governance environment of firms (i.e. the governance 
legislation) significantly affects operational performance and firm valuation. As an illustration, 
Giroud and Mueller (2010) focused on business combination laws86. By reducing the threat of 
a hostile takeover, BC laws weaken corporate governance and increase the opportunity for 
managerial slack. Consistent with the idea that competition mitigates managerial slack, the 
authors found that while companies in non-competitive industries experience, after the laws’ 
passage, a significant drop in operating performance, corporations in competitive industries 
experience no significant effect. As far as that goes, the authors conducted event studies 
around the dates of the first newspaper reports about the BC laws. They discovered that 
companies in non-competitive industries experienced a significant stock price decline, 
contrary to firms in competitive industries which experienced a small and insignificant stock 
price impact. In 2011, Giroud and Mueller (2010) published another study in which they 
argued again that managerial incentive problems are first and foremost an issue for 
companies in non-competitive industries. Consequently, companies in competitive industries 
should benefit less from good governance, while firms in noncompetitive industries, where 
the lack of competitive pressure fails to enforce discipline on managers, should benefit 
relatively more. The authors found results that go in this direction. Looking either at firm 
                                                          
84 Returns on assets. 
85 Hostile acquirers have a difficult time gaining control of companies with staggered boards (compared to traditionally elected boards). 
86 BC laws. 
39 
 
value87 or operating performance88, the effect of good governance89 on corporations in 
competitive industries is small and insignificant while the effect of good governance in non- 
competitive industries is large and significant. The two papers written by Giroud and Muller 
are very specific in the sense they make a link between performance, governance, and 
competition.  
The question of executive compensation practices has also been investigated in the literature. 
Research indeed showed that corporate performance is directly affected by executive 
compensation practices (Mehran 1995). Core et al (1999) also showed, for instance, that 
companies with weaker governance structures have greater agency problems. In turn, CEOs 
at companies with greater agency problems receive greater compensation. As a whole, firms 
with greater agency problems perform thus worse.  
Aggarwal et al (2007) used governance attributes provided by ISS90 to build a composite 
governance index for each company under study. As the one of Gompers et al (2003), their 
index was said to be “additive” in the sense the index is built as follows; it assigns a value of 
one to a governance attribute if the company meets minimally acceptable standards on that 
attribute and zero otherwise. Using that index, they compared the governance of foreign firms 
to the governance of comparable U.S. companies and they demonstrated that, on average, 
foreign firms have worse governance than matching U.S. firms. Approximately 8% of foreign 
firms have better governance than comparable U.S. companies. Next, they defined a firm's 
governance gap as the difference between the quality of its governance and the governance 
of a comparable U.S. company. By doing so, they  found that the value91 of foreign corporations 
increases with the governance gap. This result suggests that firms are rewarded by the 
markets for having better governance than their U.S. peers.  
More indications to the positive effects of corporate governance on financial performance in 
a range of countries also exist, supporting the idea of a significant relation between corporate 
governance quality and company performance. For instance, Ammann et al (2010) used the 
dataset from GMI92 and focused on 22 developed countries. In their study, they constructed 
three various governance indices; two of them are based on the additive approach and the 
                                                          
87 Measured through industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.  
88 ROA, net profit margin or sales growth.  
89 As measured once again by the GIM index.  
90 Institutional Shareholder Services. 
91 Approximated again by Tobin’s Q.  
92 Governance Metrics International. 
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last one is derived from a principal component analysis. Then, they estimated panel 
regressions of Tobin’s Q on their three alternative governance indices and a set of control 
variables. The result of their paper is obvious: there is a strong positive relation between firm- 
level corporate governance and firm valuation. Like the previously mentioned study, that of 
Beiner et al (2005) was not interested in the USA. The authors focused on Switzerland and 
constructed a firm-specific governance index. As a whole, they reached the conclusion of a 
positive relationship between corporate governance and firm value (as measured by Tobin’s 
Q).  
To further underline the importance of good corporate governance, Karpoff et al (2008) 
namely published a paper called “The cost to firms of cooking the books”. They concentrated 
on firms that misreport earnings and found that the penalties imposed by the stock market 
are huge in contrast to penalties imposed through the legal system. On average, companies 
lose 38% of their market values when news of their misconduct is reported. According to the 
authors, 24.5% of these losses reflects the market adjusting to a more accurate representation 
of firms’ financial situations. Another 8.8% reflects the expectation of legal penalties. The 
remaining 66.6% is labelled “lost reputation”. This is the decrease in present value of the firms’ 
cash flows as investors, customers, and suppliers are expected to change93 the terms of trade 
with which they do business with the company. 
This study again underlines the bad implications of weak governance (ie: presence, here, of 
financial misrepresentations).  
The literature on the governance criterion tackles many different facets of corporate 
governance and relates those to CFP measures. The picture that emerges from the literature 
is that well-governed firms perform - at least on average - better than poorly governed 
companies. 
The literature has also investigated the effect of particular environmental and/or social issues 
on CFP. However, in comparison to the literature on corporate environmental performance in 
relation to financial performance, the evidence on corporate social performance and its effect 
on financial performance is not that broad.  
Many papers used the so called “event study methodology” to analyze the link between 
                                                          
93 Lower sales and higher contracting and financing costs.  
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financial performance and the cost of equity. Hamilton (1995) showed namely that 
stockholders in companies reporting TRI94 pollution figures experienced negative, statistically 
significant abnormal returns upon the first release of the information. Those abnormal returns 
translated into an average loss of $4.1 million in stock value for TRI companies on the day the 
pollution figures were first released. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) have namely investigated 
the stock price reaction to the announcement of positive environmental news and use the 
announcement of the winning of an environmental award (verified by a third-party 
organization) as their measure for good environmental performance. The authors showed 
that positive environmental news triggers positive stock price movements. Conversely, they 
also highlighted negative stock price reactions for adverse corporate environmental events. 
Flammer (2013) also used an event study to examine the stock price reaction to news or 
events. The author supported the conclusions of the previous study by shedding in light that 
the stock market reacted positively to the announcement of eco-friendly initiatives, and 
negatively to the announcement of eco-harmful behavior. Using again an event study, Capelle- 
Blancard and Laguna (2009) analyzed the response of the stock market to chemical disasters. 
They investigated in total 64 explosions in chemical plants at 38 different firms over the time 
period from 1990 to 2005. On the day of the explosion, the average stock price reaction is 
negative with 0.76%. Two-days after the event, shareholder lost on average 1.3%. This result 
is in line with their expectations. They indeed expected investors to react to a disaster because 
many costs, such as liabilities for personal injuries or environmental penalties, are uninsured 
or barely insurable. Moreover, after an accident, stakeholders are likely to modify their belief 
about the safety of the company. This may lead to a raise in insurance premiums, the 
expectation of tighter government regulation, or the worsening of relations with customers, 
employees, suppliers and investors. 
White (1996) performed, as many authors after him did, a portfolio analysis study. He built 
three portfolios; Green95, Brown96, and Oatmeal97 thanks to information provided by the 
Council on Economic Priorities (CEP). Then, he performed, for each portfolio, the famous 
CAPM in order to evaluate the risk-adjusted financial performance through Jensen's alpha. 
Because of the fact that the green portfolio was the only one to display a significant positive 
                                                          
94 Toxics Release Inventory. 
95 Composed of firms with the highest rating with respect to environmental performance.  
96 Composed of firms with the lowest rating with respect to environmental performance. 
97 Composed of firms with a middle rating with respect to environmental performance. 
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alpha98, he highlighted that one could have earned superior investment returns over the 1989 
to 1992 period by purchasing the common stock of firms rated "green" by the CEP. Derwall et 
al (2005) investigated the concept of “eco-efficiency”, which can be thought of as the 
economic value a company creates relative to the waste it generates. The study constructed 
and evaluated two equity portfolios that differed in eco-efficiency. The hypothesis being 
tested was whether a portfolio constructed of environmentally efficient stocks will perform 
better than less efficient stocks. They reached the conclusion that the high-ranked portfolio 
provided substantially higher average returns than its low-ranked counterpart. In order to 
achieve such a result, the authors resorted to the CAPM, the Carhart four-factor model as well 
as a seven-factor model. In all cases, because the primary focus of the research was the 
performance differential between the high-ranked portfolio and the low-ranked portfolio, 
they provided the returns on a “Difference” portfolio, which was constructed by subtracting 
the low-ranked portfolio returns from the returns on the high-ranked stock portfolio. The 
influence of environmental screening on investment performance was thus finally simply the 
difference between the alpha on the high-ranked portfolio and the alpha on the low-ranked 
portfolio. By performing the seven-factor model, the results especially highlighted a 6.04% 
p.a. difference in alpha. Overall, the results suggest that the benefits of considering 
environmental criteria in the investment process can be substantial and they also raise the 
possibility that the market has undervalued eco-efficient firms relative to less eco-efficient 
companies. Kempf and Osthoff (2007) used the Carhart four-factor model99 as well as SRI 
ratings. These ratings were useful to form one portfolio of stocks with high SRI ratings and 
another one of stocks with low SRI ratings. Overall, they authors showed that a long-short 
strategy (long in the high-rated stocks, short in the low-rated stocks) yields a positive four- 
factor alpha of up to 8.7% per year. Those two studies are especially good illustrations of the 
“errors-in-expectations” hypothesis. This hypothesis assumes that SRI can deliver anomalously 
high returns because of the fact that CSR information is value-relevant, and the financial 
markets do not understand that well100. In 2011, Guenster et al investigated, just like Derwall 
et al (2005), the concept of eco-efficiency. They reported that the lowest-ranked companies 
have values and ROA that are lower compared to those of the remainder of the sample. 
                                                          
98 The green portfolio managed so to outperform the market.  
99 Note that the authors did also all the estimations using only the three Fama/French factors and results remain almost unchanged. 
100 The errors-in-expectations hypothesis predicts so that SRI can deliver superior returns due to the fact that the market systematically 
undervalues the importance of CSR.  
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Edmans (2011) specifically focused his paper on the social aspect by analyzing the relationship 
between employee satisfaction and long-run stock returns. The author found that, between 
1984 and 2009, a value-weighted portfolio of the “100 Best Companies to Work for in 
America” earned a Carhart alpha of 3.5% per year. When compared to industry-matched 
benchmarks, the alpha remains a statistically significant 2,1%. His finding implies that the stock 
market does not fully value intangibles in the form of employee relations. In his follow-up 
paper, Edmans (2012) extends the sample period until 2011 and tests for any alphas over the 
new sample period from 1984-2011. Consistent with his earlier findings, the results indicate 
an alpha of 3.8% annually in excess of the risk-free rate. Likewise, the alphas adjusting for 
industries are higher than in the shorter sample period with 2.3% annually. Given that 
abnormal returns seem to survive over the longer term, the market has still not yet priced in 
all the information regarding employee satisfaction. Empirical results also show international 
evidence relatively to the positive relation between employee satisfaction and stock returns. 
Edmans et al (2014) investigated the relation of employee satisfaction and stock returns in 14 
countries over several different time periods. Considering equal-weighted portfolios of the 
Best Companies, they founded that the alphas are positive for 11 out of the 14 countries. 
Another example of additional evidence is Fulmer et al (2003) who also focused on publicly 
traded firms included in the “100 Best Companies to Work for in America”. They analyzed the 
1995-2000 period and the results of their stock returns analyses are generally supportive of 
the assumption under which companies included on the 100 Best list exhibit better 
performance relative to other firms. In 2006, Faleye and Trahan also concentrated on firms 
selected by Fortune magazine as the “100 Best Companies to Work for in America”. They 
investigated four measures of firm value and operating performance: Tobin’s q, ROA, 
employee productivity, and total factor productivity. The authors found that the Best 
Companies significantly outperform a size- and industry-matched control group on all 
measures. Faleye and Trahan (2011) also support that view; they indeed found that labor- 
friendly firms outperform similar firms, both in terms of long-run stock market returns and 
operating results. Fu and Shan (2009)’s paper tests how a specific type of social responsibility- 
corporate equality-affects firm value. Corporate equality was measured by the CEI101. This 
index quantifies how companies treat their gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender employees, 
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consumers, and investors. Overall, the authors reached the conclusion that companies with a 
higher degree of corporate equality have higher stock returns and higher market valuation. 
Their results are, in that sense, similar to those in Gompers et al (2003). Fu and Shan (2009) 
provided evidence that corporate equality affects firm value through two channels: product 
markets and labor markets. Companies with higher CEI scores usually have more sales, higher 
profit margins, higher productivity in terms of total revenue per employee, and attract more 
employees. Their results suggest that corporate equality is appreciated by both consumers 
and employees, which can translate into higher firm value through better performance in 
product and labor markets. 
Many other studies highlighted, over time, a positive relationship between 
social/environmental criteria and firms’ performance. For example, Huselid (1995) 
investigated the impact of human resource management practices on turnover, productivity 
and corporate financial performance (namely through Tobin’s Q). The author showed that 
investments in such practices go hand in hand with lower employee turnover as well as greater 
productivity and corporate financial performance. Jiao (2010) used the two-stage least 
squares regression method102 to examine the valuation effect of stakeholder welfare. They 
constructed a stakeholder welfare score measuring the extent to which companies meet the 
expectation of their non-shareholder stakeholders103 and find it to be associated with positive 
valuation effects: a raise of one in the stakeholder welfare score leads to an increase of 0.587 
in Tobin’s Q. Their result suggest that stakeholder welfare represents intangibles104 crucial for 
shareholder value creation. Richard et al (2007) demonstrated for his part a positive 
relationship between racial diversity and Tobin’s Q. For other, more specific social dimensions, 
there is also evidence of significant and positive effects on corporate performance. For 
instance, as shown by Simpson and Kohers (2002), banks that have better scores for 
“Community Reinvestment Act Ratings” exhibit better financial performance. 
In 1997, Russo and Fouts made an analysis of 243 firms over two years, using independently 
developed environmental ratings. Executing OLS regressions, they reached the conclusion that 
higher environmental performance is associated with higher financial performance105. Thanks 
also to OLS regressions, Hart and Ahuja (1996) investigated the impact on performance of 
                                                          
102 To avoid problems of endogeneity (Specifically here to avoid the problem of reverse causality).  
103 (Such as customers, employees, communities or environment). 
104 (Such as human capital or reputation). 
105 Measured through the ROA. 
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reduced pollution levels. They showed that pollution abatement is linked to higher ROS, ROE 
and ROA. In a similar vein, Clarkson et al (2004) showed that investments in pollution 
abatement technologies pay off, especially for companies that pollute less. Likewise, as shown 
by Darnall et al (2008) through their regression analysis results, the adoption of proper 
environmental management systems increases firms’ performance. Dowell et al (2000) 
analyzed the global environmental standards of a sample of US-based MNEs106 in relation to 
their stock market performance. The authors found that companies adopting a single, 
stringent global environmental standard have much higher market values, as measured by 
Tobin’s Q, than firms defaulting to less stringent, or poorly enforced host country standards. 
Two possible explanations to their results can be made. Firstly, it may be that private 
valuations internalize environmental externalities: the less negative externalities a company 
imposes, the higher the company’s value. Secondly, it is possible that adopting stringent 
environmental standards is actually more profitable than defaulting to lower or poorly 
enforced local environmental standards. These findings are consistent with Konar and Cohen 
(2001), who concluded that companies that are disposing of relatively smaller amounts of 
toxic chemicals, and those that are confronted with fewer or no environmental lawsuits, tend 
to have a higher Q. Additionally, carbon emissions have been found to affect firm value107 in a 
significant and negative manner, as highlighted by Matsumura et al (2011). In the same line, 
King and Lenox (2002) highlighted a positive relation between waste prevention and company 
value108 as well as between waste prevention and ROA.   
Some other studies investigating the link between firms’ financial performance and the 
environmental/social aspects found either a neutral or a significant negative relationship. 
Using a portfolio analysis study, Cohen et al (1997) constructed two industry-balanced 
portfolios and namely compared both accounting and market returns of the high polluter to 
the low polluter portfolio. Overall, they founded either no penalty for investing in the green 
portfolio, or a positive return from green investing. Making also a portfolio analysis study,  
Jayachandran et al (2013) have claimed their preference for investigating a specific dimension 
of CSR rather than to focus on an aggregate sustainability measure. They have found that a 
 
                                                          
106 Multinational enterprises. 
107 In this study, it refers to market value of common equity (in millions of dollars). It is calculated using the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by the price per share of the firm’s common stock at the end of the calendar year. 
108 Measured through Tobin’s Q. 
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firm’s environmental social performance109 (ESP) does not significantly relate to Tobin’s Q.  
Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) provided some compelling evidence on the shareholder 
wealth effects of membership in voluntary environmental programs. They used an event study 
approach and documented a significant and negative stock market reaction upon the 
announcement of joining the voluntary environmental performance initiatives. Their study 
suggests that investors are interpreting participation in those programs as imposing a 
significant cost on the company. Shareholder value is therefore destroyed by voluntarily 
joining these programs. Hence, the authors conclude that corporate commitments to reduce 
GHG emissions appear to conflict with firm value maximization. In a similar vein, Jacobs et al 
(2010) also find a negative market reaction to the announcement of voluntary emission 
reduction initiatives participation. For these two studies, there seems so to be a persistent 
negative market evaluation of voluntary environmental management programs causing stock 
prices to fall on the announcement date of participation. 
Given the reviewed evidence, I come to the conclusion that the social dimension of the ESG 
universe globally has a positive influence on CFP. With respect to the environmental 
dimension, the evidence is a little more mixed but, as a whole, companies with good 
environmental policies tend to have better CFP. 
A number of studies look also at aggregated sustainability indices.  
Let us first take a look at five so called “event studies”. Cheung (2011) investigated the effect 
on stock prices of addition to, or exclusion from, the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index. 
The author revealed that, on the day of change or on the days nearby, index inclusions have a 
positive effect while index exclusions have a negative effect on respective stock prices. 
Becchetti et al (2009) tracked the stock market reaction to entries and exits from the Domini 
400 Social Index and noted that the abnormal returns around the event date are significantly 
negative in case of exit from the Domini index. Focusing on the Calvert index, Doh et al (2010) 
came to the same conclusion as the previous study. The authors indeed found that there is 
a negative shareholder wealth effect associated with a firm’s deletion from the social index. 
Note that the three studies mentioned above take the inclusion (exclusion) in a social index 
as a proxy for a corporation’s CSR quality (default). 
Finally, and using also an event study, Godfrey et al (2009) wanted to know if CSR activities 
                                                          
109 i.e.: environmental social performance. 
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could provide an insurance mechanism to preserve corporate financial performance. They 
provide evidence that sustainability quality provides insurance-like effects when negative 
events occur, helping to support the stock price upon the announcement of the negative 
event.  
Another study which relates an aggregate sustainability score to stock market performance is 
the one of Eccles et al (2013). Using a four-factor model, they found that annual abnormal 
performance is higher for the high sustainability group compared to the low sustainability 
group by 4.8% on a value-weighted base and by 2.3% on an equal weighted-base. This finding 
points to the possibility of earning an alpha by investing in firms with a superior sustainability 
profile. The authors also found that high sustainability companies perform better when we 
consider accounting rates of return, such as ROE and ROA.  
The effects of an aggregated sustainability measure have also been investigated in the context 
of corporate mergers and acquisitions. For instance, through the performance of a Carhart’s 
regression, Deng et al (2013) showed that, by following a hedge portfolio strategy which goes 
long in acquirers with a better sustainability profile and goes short in acquirers with a worse 
sustainability profile, investors are able to realize an annual risk-adjusted alpha of 4.8%, 3.6%, 
and 3.6% over one-, two-, and three-year holding periods respectively. Aktas et al (2011) 
support the benefits of SRI in the case of a merger or acquisition. They showed that 
acquirer abnormal returns are positively associated with targets’ social and environmental 
performance. Their result indicates that the better the target is in terms of environmental and 
social performance, the higher the gain for acquirer shareholders. This indicates that SRI in 
case of M&A announcements can be value creating.  
Up to now, we have seen that many papers found that superior ESG/CSR quality translates 
into superior corporate performance relative to firms with lower ESG/CSR quality. Against this, 
there is some evidence indicating the existence of a negative or neutral relationship between 
aggregate sustainability scores and corporate performance. 
Relatively to that, numerous papers compare the performance of SRI indices to conventional 
indices. Sauer (1997) namely used the Domini 400 Social Index for the socially screened 
portfolio along with S&P 500 and CRSP110 value weighted market indexes as unrestricted 
benchmark portfolios. He first compared the average monthly raw returns and variability of 
                                                          
110 Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices. 
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the DSI with the two unrestricted benchmark portfolios. Then, he examined Jensen’s alpha for 
the Domini 400 Social Index using the Standard and Poor’s 500 index and CRSP value weighted  
market index as proxies for the market return. Finally, he analyzed the transformed difference 
of the Sharpe’ s index between the DSI and two unrestricted benchmark portfolios. Whatever 
the element under study, all results appear to be not statistically significant. As a whole, the 
empirical evidence presented in this paper clearly indicates that investors can choose socially 
responsible investments that are consistent with their value system and beliefs without being 
forced to sacrifice performance. Statman (2000) based his study on the comparison of the 
performance of the Domini Social Index and the S&P 500 index. He used Jensen’s alpha as a 
measure of performance and reached the conclusion that there is not statistically significant 
difference in the performance of the two indices under consideration. In 2005, Statman (2000) 
published another study  where he principally compared the performance of the S&P 500 
index relatively to those of four indexes111 of socially responsible corporations. Here he used 
the Fama and French three-factor model in the analysis of returns. His results led him to 
conclude that “the hypothesis under which returns of socially responsible companies are 
equal to those of conventional companies cannot be rejected”. Throughout the Schröder 
(2007) study, different settings to test performance are applied to the 29 SRI stock indexes 
under consideration. Overall, the performance tests indicate that the SRI screens for equities 
do not lead to a significant performance difference, neither an out- nor an under- 
performance. Statman and Glushkov (2009) analyzed returns of stocks rated on social 
responsibility by KLD and find that this tilt gave socially responsible investors a return 
advantage relative to conventional investors. However, typical socially responsible investors 
also shun stocks of companies associated with tobacco, alcohol, gambling, firearms, military,  
and nuclear operations. The authors found that such shunning brought to socially responsible 
investors a return disadvantage relative to conventional investors. The two effects largely 
balance out, so that socially responsible indexes have returns that are approximately equal to 
those of conventional indexes. Lee and Faff (2009), for their part, put in light that a leading 
CSP portfolio underperforms its lagging counterpart. One explanation they advanced is that 
higher returns for lagging CSP firms compensates for higher idiosyncratic risk. Overall, the 
authors provided empirical evidence in support of this view. They examined the influence of 
                                                          
111 The Domini 400 Social Index, the Calvert Social Index, the Citizens Index, and the U.S. portion of the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. 
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idiosyncratic risk on various portfolio returns by constructing an idiosyncratic risk-mimicking 
portfolio in the spirit of SMB and HML. Interestingly, their results suggest that a significant 
proportion of the return difference of leading and lagging CSP firms or portfolios is plausibly 
explained by differences in idiosyncratic risk. 
Angel and Rivoli (1997) predicted that a socially controversial stock that investors shun has a 
higher expected return, and that the expected return increases with the proportion of socially 
responsible investors in the market. In a similar vein, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) showed that 
US sin stocks have higher expected returns than otherwise US comparable stocks. Those 
results are consistent with sin-stocks being neglected by norm-constrained investors and 
facing greater litigation risk112 heightened by social norms. As a robustness check, they also 
extended their analysis outside of the US to seven large markets in Europe and to Canada. 
Even when considering these markets, they reached the conclusion that sin stocks do 
outperform other stocks. Using both CAPM and FF three-factor model, Fabozzi et al. (2008) 
also presented empirical evidence that sin stocks, have outperformed the market on a risk- 
adjusted basis. Notably, this result holds even when considering different sin industries and 
countries.  
Servaes and Tamayo (2013)’s paper shows that CSR and firm value are positively related for 
firms with high customer awareness, as proxied by advertising expenditures. For firms with 
low customer awareness, the relation is either negative or insignificant. Xueming and 
Bhattacharya (2006) developed, tested and approved a conceptual model that proposes that 
CSR initiatives enable firms to build a base of satisfied customers, which in turn contributes 
positively to the market value of the firm. However, the authors showed that this reasoning is 
conditional to corporate abilities113. Notably, the authors find that in firms with low 
innovativeness capability, CSR actually reduces customer satisfaction levels and, through the 
lowered satisfaction, harms market value. Those last two studies imply a conditionality to have 
a positive link between financial performance and CSR.  
Derwall et al (2011) constructed both a shunned-stock portfolio and a strong-employee- 
relations portfolio. The first one is based on the shunned-stock hypothesis and the second one 
on the errors-in-expectations hypothesis. They analyzed the evolution of the abnormal returns 
                                                          
112 For instance, claims against the tobacco industry have especially included health harms (nicotine addiction or illness), wrongful death, 
healthcare costs (money spent treating those who get sick from tobacco products), involvement in smuggling, racketeering, conspiracy, 
defective product, concealment of scientific evidence, fraud, deception, misconduct, failure to warn consumers adequately of the dangers 
of tobacco products, negligence and exposure of the public to unreasonable danger. 
113 Product quality and innovativeness capability. 
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of both over the 1992-2008 time period. While the two portfolios provide significant abnormal 
returns in the short run, the alphas of the socially responsible portfolio diminish strongly in 
the long run and even become insignificant the latter years. As a reminder, the shunned-stock 
hypothesis predicts that shun stocks trade at relatively lower prices and offers higher expected 
returns due to lower risk sharing opportunities. The errors-in-expectations hypothesis predicts  
that SRI can generate higher returns due to the fact that the market systematically 
undervalues the importance of SRI. As a whole, the economic logic predicts that only one 
hypothesis can survive in the long run; over time, investors improve their understanding of 
the impact of SRI on companies’ future cash flows and it is expected that superior returns due 
to the errors-in-expectations hypothesis will disappear (exactly as shown by the results of the 
authors).  
In an interesting paper written by Hawn and Ioannou (2013), the authors investigated whether 
just symbolic CSR actions affect firm value or whether corporations have to undertake real, 
“substantive” CSR actions, in order to affect firm value. To answer that question, the authors 
use a composite CSR index based on the data provided by ASSET4 and which consists of sub- 
ratings regarding corporate ESG performance. Their results indicate that symbolic changes 
significantly increase Tobin’s Q, while substantive CSR actions do not have any significant 
effect on firms’ performance. This study suggests that companies with an established base of 
CSR resources might undertake symbolic actions largely because it is relatively less costly for 
them to do so, and also because such companies enjoy sufficient credibility with social actors 
to get away with it. It may be also simply the firm’s past CSR reputation which matters for the 
future financial performance effects of newly introduced CSR actions. Another recent paper  
of interest is the one of Halbritter and Dorfleitner (2015) called “The wages of social 
responsibility – where are they? A critical review of ESG investing”. The authors investigated 
the link between corporate social and financial performance based on ESG ratings from three 
different114 ESG data providers. They followed two different strategies: an ESG portfolio 
method and cross-sectional regressions. Overall, their results suggest that investors should 
not expect abnormal returns by trading a difference portfolio of high and low rated companies 
with regard to ESG aspects.  
There are also some studies which focus on the European market instead of the United States’ 
                                                          
114 ASSET4, Bloomberg and KLD.  
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one. Brammer et al (2006) namely investigated the relationship between corporate social 
performance and financial performance, measured using stock returns, for a sample of UK115  
quoted companies. Overall, the authors support so the argument that expenditure on some 
corporate social activities is destructive of shareholder value. To explain their result, the 
author namely argued that it may be the case that shareholders are willing to forgo returns in 
order to feel morally at ease with the stocks that they hold, so that required returns on the 
stocks of socially responsible firms are lower. Van de Velde et al (2005) used CSR rating from 
the French research firm Vigeo to test SRI portfolios in the EMU116 area. They estimated 
three-factor alphas for the “best” and “worst” CSR portfolios for the 2000-2004 period. Their 
results indicate that high-CSR-rated portfolios perform better than low-rated portfolios, but 
not significantly so. Overall, their study suggests that there is no cost involved in integrating 
sustainable dimensions in the investment policy.  
This section has provided an overview of studies which use an aggregate CSR measure in order 
to test the relation between CSR and CFP. The review that was established provides mixed 
findings, although the evidence points slightly more towards a positive relationship between 
CSR and performance. 
Over time, some meta-studies, reports and literature reviews (available in Appendix 2) 
investigating the relation between sustainability and firms’ performance have also been 
published and reach generally the aforementioned conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
115 United Kingdom. 
116 European Monetary Union. 
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Description of the data 
 
As a reminder, we investigate in this study the impact firms’ ESG commitment has on their 
cost of equity. More precisely, we analyze the influence of ESG on the “Beta” risk factor as 
well as on the risk-adjusted return before turning to the inclusion of a new ESG factor in 
traditional Fama-French asset pricing model.  
To this end, I decided to work with a relatively high number of companies. More precisely, I 
chose a sample of two hundred companies117 which are listed118 on the S&P 500119. 
I collected ESG criteria for these firms on Yahoo Finance. The Yahoo Finance’s website has 
indeed a “Sustainability” tab under which, each month, ESG data are updated. Note that all of 
those ESG data are in fact provided by Sustainalytics120, one of the most famous third party 
ESG data providers previously mentioned in this work. On the Yahoo Finance site, I 
selected the overall ESG rating and also the individual scores for the environment, social and 
governance aspects. All of the ESG criteria were updated on February 2019.  
Then, I also checked on Macrobond in order to download the daily adjusted closing prices for 
each of the two hundred companies for the year 2018. Focusing only on the year 2018 is 
justified by the fact that I only had ESG data for the month of February 2019.  
As I chose to work respectively with the famous Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the 
Fama-French three-factor model, it was then necessary to collect data on the risk-free rate, 
the return on the market, the historic excess returns of small-cap companies over large-cap 
companies and the historic excess returns of value stocks over growth stocks. I found all of 
those data in the data library of Kenneth French121.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
117 See Appendix 3 for an overview of the firms belonging to the sample.  
118 Note that I have been on the following website in order to find companies included in the S&P 500 Index: 
https://www.zonebourse.com/S-P-500-4985/composition/. 
119 This index tracks 500 large U.S. companies across a wide span of industries and sectors. The S&P 500 Index represents approximately 
80% of the total value of the U.S. stock market.  
See, for instance, Cohen et al (1997); Dowell et al (2000); Matsumura et al (2011) or even Oikonomou et al (2012) who have also used S&P 
500’s firms in their paper.  
120 For more information on the way Sustainalytics establish ESG scores see: www.sustainalytics.com. See, for instance, Auer and 
Schuhmacher (2015) who also used data from Sustainalytics in their study.  
121 See: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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Brief presentation of the asset pricing models122  
 
Focus on the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
CAPM stands for Capital Asset Pricing Model. It is an economic theory which measures the 
cost of equity or, to put it differently, the rate of return an investor requires from a stock 
before looking into other viable opportunities.  
According to CAPM, beta is the only relevant measure of a stock's risk. It measures a stock's 
relative volatility-that is, it shows how much the price of a particular stock jumps up and down 
compared with how much the entire stock market jumps up and down. Beta is thus, in other 
words, the stock’s sensitivity to market risk123. If a share price moves exactly in line with the 
market, then the stock's beta is 1. If the beta of the stock is one, then it has the same level of 
risk as the stock market. A stock with a beta of 1.5 would rise by 15% if the market rose by 
10% and fall by 15% if the market fell by 10%. If the beta of the stock is thus greater than one, 
then it implies higher level of risk and volatility as compared to the stock market. Conversely, 
a stock with a beta of 0.5 would rise by 5% if the market rose by 10% and fall by 5% if the 
market fell by 10%. If the beta of the stock is less than one and greater than zero, it implies 
the stock prices will move with the overall market. However, the stock prices will remain less 
risky and volatile. 
The CAPM formula is the following one:  
Cost of equity124 = Risk-free rate + Beta*Market risk premium 
Where:  
▪ The Risk-free rate (Rf) would be the rate that is expected on an investment that is assumed 
to have no risk involved.  
▪ Beta is the factor’s coefficient (sensitivity).  
▪ The Market risk premium is the difference of the Return on the market (Rm) and the Risk- 
free rate (Rf). 
                           
                                                          
122 Section especially developed thanks to Womack and Zhang’ s (2003) paper.  
123 Market risk, also known as non-diversifiable risk or systematic risk, is the risk attributable to market factors that affect all firms and that 
cannot be eliminated through diversification. For example, if there is inflation, all companies experience an increase in prices of inputs, and 
generally their profitability will suffer if they cannot fully pass the price increase on to their customers. 
124 Also known as “Required rate of return” or “Expected return”. 
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Focus on the Fama and French three-factor model 
 
As previously said, CAPM uses a single factor, beta, to compare a portfolio with the market as 
a whole. But more generally, factors can be added to a regression model to give a better R- 
squared fit. The best-known approach like this is the three-factor model developed by 
University of Chicago professors Eugene Fama and Kenneth French in the 1990s. 
Fama and French started with the observation that two classes of stocks tend to do better 
than the market as a whole: (i) those of small-cap companies relative to those of large-cap 
companies (ii) those of high book-to-market companies versus those of low book-to-market 
companies. They then added two factors to CAPM to reflect a portfolio's exposure to these 
two classes.  
The FF three-factor formula is thus:  
Cost of equity = Risk-free rate + Beta1*Market risk premium + Beta2*SMB + Beta3*HML 
Where: 
▪ SMB (Small Minus Big) is a size effect based on a market capitalization of a corporation. 
SMB measures the historic excess of small-cap companies over big-cap companies. 
▪ HML (High Minus Low) is a value premium. It represents the spread in returns between 
companies with a high book-to-market ratio (value companies) and companies with a low 
book-to-market ratio (growth companies). 
 
As a whole, the Fama and French three-factor model is an expansion of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model. The model is adjusted for outperformance tendencies. Also, two extra risk 
factors make this model more flexible relative to CAPM. 
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Research methodology 
 
Based on all of the data described in the previous section, I first estimated the average annual 
return for each company. This is used to make simple statistical and econometric exercises at 
the beginning of the next section125 and also at the very end of it, as a dependent variable of 
the final regressions. The average annual return for a firm i (Ri2018) is calculated as follows:  
Equation used to determine the average 2018 return (Ri2018) for a given company 
• Mean of {[(Pit-Pit-1)/Pit-1]*100}          (1)     
Where Pit is the adjusted closing price of a particular firm at time t and Pit-1 is the adjusted 
closing price of a given firm at time t-1.  
 
Thanks to these average annual returns, I first performed cross-sectional regressions having 
has a dependent variable the average 2018 return and, as independent variable, the ESG, E, S 
or G scores.  
Equation used to run cross-sectional regressions having as a dependent variable the average 2018 returns (Ri2018) 
and, as an independent variable, the ESG, E, S or G scores  
• Ri2018 =  c + ȠESG ESGi + Ɛi          (2) 
• Ri2018 =  c + ȠE Ei + Ɛi         (3) 
• Ri2018 =  c + ȠS Si + Ɛi         (4) 
• Ri2018 =  c + ȠG Gi + Ɛi         (5) 
Where ȠESG, ȠE, ȠS and ȠG are the coefficients related respectively to the ESG, E, S and G 
factors, c is the constant and Ɛi is the random error.  
 
Then, I estimated, for each company under study, the excess return. The excess return is 
simply the return minus the risk-free rate.  
Equation used to determine the excess return of a given company 
• {[(Pit-Pit-1)/Pit-1]*100} – Rft          (6)                               
Where Rft is the risk-free rate at time t.  
 
                                                          
125 That is to say, “Discussion of findings” (Equations 2,3,4 and 5). 
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This excess return is in fact the dependent variable used in order to run the CAPM and FF time- 
series regressions. Given the fact that I had 251 observations for the risk-free rate126 for the 
year 2018 and a variable number of returns depending on the company considered, I used the 
“RECHERCHEV” function available on Excel to make a matching of the dates.  
Next, I first realized the 200 CAPM time-series regressions127 according to the following 
equation: 
Equation used to run the CAPM time-series regression for a particular company 
• Rt – Rft = α + ßm (Rmt - Rft) + Ɛt          (7)                                                                                                                          
Where Rt is the expected return of the security at time t, Rft is the risk-free rate at time t, α is 
the alpha of the security, ßm is the beta of the security, Rmt is the return of the market at time 
t, Rt – Rft is the excess return of the security at time t, Rmt - Rft is the market premium at time 
t and Ɛt is the random error of the security at time t.  
Thanks to the previous step, I already had the dependent variable (the excess return) and the 
independent variable in this case is the market premium (Rmt - Rft), collected on the Kenneth 
French website. 
Thanks to those regressions, I do obtain, for each company, a constant (called “alpha”) and a 
beta related to Rmt - Rft (ßm).  
Following the same reasoning, I then ran 200 FF three-factor model time-series regressions128. 
Here I still had the excess return as a dependent variable but three independent variables; the 
market premium as well as the SMB and HML factors.  
Equation used to run the Fama-French three-factor model time-series regression for a particular company 
• Rt – Rft = α + ßm (Rmt - Rft) + ßs SMBt + ßh HMLt + Ɛt          (8)                                                                                                                           
Thanks to these regressions, I get for each firm an alpha, a beta related to Rm-Rf (ßm), a beta 
related to SMB (ßs) and, finally, a beta related to HML (ßh).  
 
From here, I had all the necessary data to develop the main hypothesis at the heart of my 
Master’ s thesis as well as the two peripheral investigations129. 
                                                          
126 As well as for Rm-Rf, SMB and HML.  
127 See Appendix 5 as an example for Abbott Laboratories.  
128 See also Appendix 5 as an example for Abbott Laboratories.  
129 Note that for the two peripheral investigations, the econometric logic I used can be justified thanks to the paper of Ziegler et al (2007) 
who used both CAPM and FF three-factor model and made first time-series regressions followed by cross-sectional ones.  
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The first one peripheral investigation is to see if the betas related to the market premium 
(either of the CAPM130 or of the FF three-factor model131) are influenced by sustainable data. 
To test this hypothesis, I made cross-sectional regressions having as a dependent variable the 
betas132 related to market premium and, as independent variable(s), the ESG scores, the E 
scores, the S scores, the G scores, or the E, S and G scores. 
Equations used to test the first peripheral investigation 
• ß̂im = c + λESG ESGi + Ɛi          (9) 
• ß̂im = c + λE Ei + Ɛi          (10) 
• ß̂im = c + λS Si + Ɛi          (11) 
• ß̂im = c + λG Gi + Ɛi          (12) 
• ß̂im = c + λE Ei + λS Si + λG Gi + Ɛi          (13)                                             
Where ß̂im are the betas related to the market premium of the CAPM or of the FF three-factor 
model; c is a constant; ESGi are the global ESG scores and λESG the related coefficient; Ei are 
the environmental scores and λE the related coefficient; Si are the social scores and λS the 
related coefficient; Gi are the governance scores and λG the related coefficient; Ɛi is the random 
error. 
The second peripheral investigation is to see if the alphas133 (either of the CAPM134 or of the 
FF135) are impacted by the sustainable data. To test that, I made cross-sectional regressions 
having as a dependent variable the alphas and, as independent variable(s), the ESG scores, the 
E scores, the S scores, the G scores, or the E, S and G scores.  
Equations used to test the second peripheral investigation 
• ?̂?i = c + λESG ESGi + Ɛi          (14)                                                                                                 
• ?̂?i = c + λE Ei + Ɛi          (15)                                                                                                                                    
• ?̂?i = c + λS Si + Ɛi          (16) 
• ?̂?i = c + λG Gi + Ɛi          (17) 
• ?̂?i = c + λE Ei + λS Si + λG Gi + Ɛi          (18) 
                                                          
130 See, for instance, Sharfman and Fernando (2008) or Salama et al (2011) who investigated CAPM’ betas. 
131 See, for instance, Albuquerque et al (2014) or Gregory et al (2014) who investigated market betas from the FF three-factor model.  
132 Of the CAPM or, of the FF three-factor model. 
133 See, for instance, Fabozzi et al. (2008) or Tripathi and Bhandari (2016) who used both pricing models in their paper to analyze abnormal 
returns.  
134 See, for instance, White (1996), Statman (2000) or Derwall et al (2005) or who analyzed abnormal returns thanks to the CAPM. 
135 See, for instance, Statman (2005) or Van de Velde et al (2005) who analyzed abnormal returns thanks to the FF three-factor model. 
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Where ?̂?i are the alphas of the CAPM or of the FF three-factor model. 
Finally, the main hypothesis is to see if the average annual return (Ri2018) can, among other 
things, be explained by the creation of a fourth factor; namely an ESG factor, an E factor, a S 
factor or a G factor.  
Let us take the example of the ESG factor as an explanation but keep in mind that the logic is 
the same for the creation of the E, S or G factor. 
In order to construct the ESG factor, I ranked my two hundred companies according to their 
global ESG rating.  
Then, I selected the first and last deciles136 of these ranking, representing respectively 
companies that excel and those that, conversely, have the lowest performance in ESG. As a 
result, I obtained two portfolios, each containing twenty firms.   
From there, I recovered the data of the returns of the companies included in the low ESG 
portfolio or in the high ESG one. 
Next, I calculated the means of the returns of the 20 firms in the first decile and the means of 
the returns of the 20 firms in the last decile. As a result, I did obtain one high ESG equally 
weighted portfolio as well as one low ESG equally weighted portfolio.  
My ESG factor was estimated by subtracting the means of the returns of the best ESG 
companies from the means of the returns of the poorest ESG companies. This new factor can 
in fact be viewed as a kind of investment strategy that takes a long position in low ESG 
portfolio stocks and a short position in high ESG portfolio stocks.137 
Then, I  performed 200 time-series138 regressions139 having as a dependent variable the excess 
return and, as independent variables, the market premium as well as the SMB, HML and ESG  
factors.  
Equations used for the time series regressions linked to the core hypothesis 
• Rt – Rft = α + ßm (Rmt – Rft) + ßs SMBt + ßh HMLt + ßESG ESGt + Ɛt          (19)                                                                     
                                                          
136 See, for instance, Halbritter and Dorfleitner (2015) who sort companies based on their sustainable scores and then take the best/worst 
quintiles to form the fourth factor they use latter in times series regressions.  
137 This factor is so constructed in the same logic as the SMB and HML factors. Those factors can be viewed as a strategy which is, 
respectively, long on portfolio with small-cap stocks/high book-to-market and short on portfolio with large-cap stocks/low book-to-market. 
See also Ashbaugh et al (2004), Hübel and Scholz (2019), Görgen et al (2019) or Girerd-Potin et al (2014) for a construction almost identical 
to mine of the sustainable risk factor. 
138 See Appendix 8 as an example for Abbott Laboratories.  
139 As an example, to justify the econometric procedure of the core hypothesis, see the Jin (2017)’s paper. The author followed the two-
step procedure of Fama-MacBeth; performing first times-series regressions and then, a cross-sectional one. As a reminder, he did it to 
analyze the relevance of a novel sustainable factor in a classical pricing model. 
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Where ESGt is the fourth factor I created and ßESG its related coefficient.  
Thanks to these regressions, I got for each firm an alpha, a beta related to Rm-Rf (ßm), a beta 
related to SMB (ßs), a beta related to HML (ßh) and, finally, a beta related to ESG (ßESG).  
Relatively to the creation of the E, S, or G factor, the equations are the following ones;  
• Rt – Rft = α + ßm (Rmt – Rft) + ßs SMBt + ßh HMLt + ßE Et + Ɛt          (20) 
• Rt – Rft = α + ßm (Rmt – Rft) + ßs SMBt + ßh HMLt + ßS St + Ɛt          (21)                                                                    
• Rt – Rft = α + ßm (Rmt – Rft) + ßs SMBt + ßh HMLt + ßG Gt + Ɛt          (22)                                                                                                                                          
Finally, I ran a final regression, of cross-sectional type, having as a dependent variable the 
average annual returns for the year 2018 and, as independent variables, the coefficients ßm, 
ßs, ßh and ßesg of equation 19.  
Equations used for the cross-sectional regressions linked to the main hypothesis 
• Ri2018 = c + χm ß̂im + χs ß̂is + χh ß̂ih + χESG ß̂iESG + Ɛi          (23) 
Where ß̂im, ß̂is, ß̂ih and ß̂iESG are now variables and χm, χs, χh and χESG their related coefficients.  
About the creation of the E, S, or G factor, the equations are so;  
• Ri2018 = c + χm ß̂im + χs ß̂is + χh ß̂ih + χE ß̂iE + Ɛi          (24) 
• Ri2018 = c + χm ß̂im + χs ß̂is + χh ß̂ih + χS ß̂iS + Ɛi          (25) 
• Ri2018 = c + χm ß̂im + χs ß̂is + χh ß̂ih + χG ß̂iG + Ɛi          (26) 
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Discussion of findings 
 
Let us now investigate an essential part of this Master’ s thesis, namely the discussion of 
findings. These were obtained through numerous calculations and econometric operations.  
In this part, I will first expose some descriptive statistics before taking a look at some 
histograms. Then, we will consider some scatter plots and correlations and finally, we will turn 
to the description of the regression analysis.  
Note that the stars present in the tables refer to the three common significance levels.  
More precisely, *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level or better, ** indicates significance 
at the 0.05 level or better, * indicates significance at 0.10 level or better. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 below, presents the results of the descriptive statistics for the following variables; 
Ri2018, ESG scores, E scores, S scores and G scores. These four elements are central to my 
analysis, hence the need to take a little time to browse them in more detail.   
We can see that, when considering the two hundred companies, the mean of the average 
returns for the year 2018 is negative (-0.0013217).  
The mean of the global ESG scores is 61.5.  
Among the three factors (environmental, social and governance), firms appear to make the 
best performance regarding to the environmental aspect (mean of 64.235) and they show the 
least good result on the social aspect (mean of 59.23).  
If we look at the maximum and minimum lines, it is surprising to see that this is with respect 
to the environment that we face the most extreme results. Indeed, in this column, we have 
an exceptional score of 98 and, conversely, a very poor score of 36. 
We can take a look at the standard deviation, a measure that is used to quantify the amount 
of variation or dispersion of a set of data values. In our table, the standard deviation is without 
surprise the highest in the third column, meaning that the data points are spread out over a 
wider range of values when considering the environmental aspect. 
Then, we have the skewness which reflects the asymmetry of a distribution. Given the fact 
that the skewness of each variable is comprised between -0.5 and 0.5, it can be said that the 
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distribution of each variable is approximately symmetric140.  
Finally, we also have the kurtosis which reflects the characteristics of the tails of a distribution. 
In the table, the kurtosis are above 3 in the two first columns meaning that we face leptokurtic 
distributions while the last three columns have a kurtosis lower than 3 meaning that we face 
there platykurtic distributions.   
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables Ri2018, ESG, E, S, and G 
 Ri2018 ESG scores E scores S scores G scores 
Mean -0.013217 61.50000 64.23500 59.23000 62.97500 
Median -0.006210 62.00000 64.00000 59.00000 63.00000 
Maximum 0.194861 87.00000 98.00000 88.00000 79.00000 
Minimum -0.292825 41.00000 36.00000 38.00000 41.00000 
Std.Dev. 0.079354 8.188115 12.85832 10.54481 7.749493 
Skewness -0.209736 0.030008 0.075517 0.266496 -0.339123 
Kurtosis 3.449300 3.196237 2.399165 2.861118 2.930933 
      
Observations 200 200 200 200 200 
 
Histograms 
 
In this part, I found it relevant to realize the histograms relating to the ESG, E, S and G scores.141  
Those histograms will provide a visual interpretation of numerical sustainable data by showing 
the number of sustainable data points that fall within a specified range of values (called 
“intervals”).  
Most interestingly, they will allow us to have a clear visualization of the distributions of the 
sustainable data - distributions which were already analyzed in the previous section 
through the various skewness and kurtosis. 
The ideal for the relevance of our subsequent analyses would be to have distributions that are 
as close as possible to a normal one. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
140 Bulmer (1979) established a rule of thumb under which a skewness comprised between -0.5 and 0.5 implies an approximately 
symmetric distribution.  
141 See for instance Ammann et al (2010) who represented the empirical distributions of their two additively constructed corporate 
governance indices. Another example is the one of Beiner et al (2005) who have also representing the empirical distribution of their 
corporate governance index. Both papers did it to verify the distribution’s symmetry as well as to ensure they are substantial differences in 
firm-level corporate governance between firms belonging to the sample. Statman (2005) represented also, as another example, the 
distribution of the social scores of companies belonging to his study. 
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Histogram 1: Representation of the ESG global scores 
 
 
 
 
Histogram 2: Representation of the environmental scores 
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Histogram 3: Representation of the social scores 
 
 
 
 
Histogram 4: Representation of the governance scores 
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Relatively to the first two histogram, namely the one relative to the global ESG scores and the 
one related to the environmental criterion, we can see that we face distributions which look 
quite symmetric, which is consistent with, respectively, the skewness of 0.030008 and the one 
of 0.075517 previously obtained. Those values are very close to the skewness of a normal 
distribution (0). With respect to the third histogram, we can see that the bulk of the data is a 
little bit more on the left and that the right tail is slightly longer. Those facts are the sign of a 
weak positively skewed distribution. We remain again consistent with the low positive value 
of the skewness relative to the social aspect (0.266496) previously found. Finally, when 
looking at the fourth histogram, the bulk of the data is a little bit more on the right and the 
left tail is slightly longer, implying a negatively skewed distribution. Once more, it is coherent 
with respect to the low negative skewness (-0.339123) previously notified. 
Considering the degree of tailedness in the variable distributions, which is measured through 
the kurtosis’ coefficients, we can hardly draw a conclusion based on the graphs of the ESG, 
social and governance scores. This is consistent with the kurtosis previously obtained, which 
were, in each case, close to the threshold value of 3. When looking at the second histogram, 
we can here draw a conclusion thanks to the tails of the distribution. Indeed, tails appear to 
be thinner than those of the normal distribution, implying a platykurtic distribution and so, a 
kurtosis lower than 3. In the previous section, we got a kurtosis of 2.399165 relative to the 
environment aspect. This value is once again consistent with our graphical analysis. 
As a whole, the distributions’ characteristics of our sustainable data are very close to the one 
of a normal one - namely a kurtosis of 3 and a skewness of 0. This implies, on the one hand, 
that among our sample all kinds of RI firms are represented (those with poor ESG performance 
as well as pioneers in the field) and, on the other hand, that this representation is fair (the 
two hundred companies are not attached to some specific scores; there is then neither over 
nor under representation of a given ESG score).  
My sample of sustainable corporations is thus truly representative and well suited to perform 
regressions which especially aim to make statistical inference.  
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Sector graph 
 
When quickly looking at the sector graph of the sample142, we can see that there are more 
than ten different sectors that are represented, which implies that the sample is also very 
diverse with regard to companies for which ESG criteria have been investigated. This is again 
a positive point in a perspective of statistical inference. 
Figure B: Sector graph of my sample  
 
 
Scatter plots and correlations 
 
Next, I found it interesting to realize scatter plots of the ESG, E, S or G score and the average 
annual return for the year 2018 (Ri2018).  
Scatter plots are important in statistics because they can show the extent of correlation, if 
any, between the variables under study.  
If no correlation exists between the variables, the points appear randomly scattered on the 
coordinate plane. If a large correlation exists, the points concentrate near a straight line.  
Scatter plots are therefore useful data visualization tools for illustrating a trend. 
Note that I added to this scatter plot a regression line to have a better visualization of the 
potentially existing correlation.  
As you will observe in Table 2, I also calculated the different correlation coefficients of 
Pearson; those values will be useful to complete our analysis in this section. Indeed, their 
                                                          
142 See, for instance, Reverte (2011) or Eccles et al (2013) who described also the sector composition of their sample.  
Sector graph of the sample
Energy Technology Financial Services
Healthcare Real Estate Utilities
Consumer Cyclical Consumer Defensive Industrials
Basic Materials Communication Services
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value, always comprised between -1 and 1, will inform us about the intensity of the linear 
relationships as well as about the sign (positive or negative) of those relationships.  
Finally, under the "Preliminary results" tab of the next section, I performed regressions 
between the average annual returns for the year 2018 and the ESG, E, S, or G scores in order 
to find, among other things, the p-value associated to the various correlation coefficients. 
Those p-values will give us information about the statistical significance of the results. 
Moreover, the simple regression models described above will allow us to quantify the extent 
to which one variable can promote a positive or negative change in another variable.  
Table 2: Correlation coefficients of Pearson  
 Ri2018 ESG scores E scores S scores G scores 
Ri2018 1 
 
    
ESG scores -0.11774298 
 
1    
E scores 
 
-0.047550586 
 
0.813175993 
 
1   
S scores 
 
-0.138050528 
 
0.828770209 
 
0.446821273 1  
G scores 
 
-0.054396211 
 
0.566114921 
 
0.269355659 
 
0.332139859 
 
1 
 
Figure C: Scatter plot of the ESG global scores and the average annual returns for the year 2018 
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Figure D: Scatter plot of the environmental scores and the average annual returns for the year 2018 
 
 
 
Figure E: Scatter plot of the social scores and the average annual returns for the year 2018 
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Figure F: Scatter plot of the governance scores and the average annual returns for the year 2018 
 
On the first figure, we can see that there is a negative correlation between the two variables. 
Indeed, the higher the average annual return, the lower the overall ESG score. 
By calculating the correlation coefficient, I do obtain a number of -0.11774298. We can thus 
say that we face a low negative correlation.  
I also estimated the p-value associated to this coefficient of correlation. I got a p-value of 
0.0968 meaning that our observation appears to be statistically significant considering the 
10% level of significance.  
The three other figures are there to see separately the correlation between the average 
annual returns for the year 2018 and the environmental, social and governance scores. 
By focusing on the environmental scores, we still observe a negative correlation with the 
average annual returns; the lower the environmental score, the higher the average annual 
return.  
The correlation coefficient in this case is - 0.047550586. The correlation between the two 
variables is still negative but lower than considering the total ESG score. 
The p-value associated to this second coefficient of correlation is equal to 0.5037. It means 
here that our result is not significant from a statistically point of view.  
If we care about the social scores, we can again notice a negatieve correlation with the average 
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annual returns for the year 2018. Here, when the social score is big, the return is low. 
This criterion reflects the higgest negative correlation with the average annual returns given 
the fact that its correlation coefficient has a value of - 0.138050528. The estimated p-value 
related to the coefficient is 0.0512. That means that this result is clearly statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  
Finally, if we look at the governance scores, we still see a negative correlation with the average 
annual returns; when the return is high, the governance score is lower.  
The estimation of the correlation coefficient, whose value is - 0.054396211, certifies us that 
there is a low negative correlation between the variables. The estimated p-value is about 
0.4443. That means that our result is not statistically significant.  
 
Regressions Analysis 
 
a) Preliminary results 
In this part and, as previously said, I firstly made an OLS regression having as a dependent 
variable the average annual returns for the year 2018 and, as independent variable, the global 
ESG scores. Note that all tables presented in this section are available in their entirety in 
Appendix 4 of this Master’ s thesis and that the green number in tables’ title refers to the 
number of the equation I used to obtain such results.  
Table 3: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the average annual returns for the year 2018 
and, as an independent variable, the global ESG scores (2) 
Dependent Variable: Average annual returns in 2018 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.056960 0.042432 1.342379 0.1810 
Global ESG scores -0.001141 0.000684 -1.668396 0.0968* 
This regression shows us that when a company improves its ESG score by one unit, its average 
annual return decreases by -0.001141 percent.  
I then did three other OLS regressions using the same logic but taking as independent variable 
the environmental, social and governance scores. The results obtained in this regard are 
shown below. 
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Table 4: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the average annual returns for the year 2018 
and, as an independent variable, the environmental scores (3) 
Dependent Variable: Average annual returns in 2018 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.005633 0.028696 0.196289 0.8446 
E scores -0.000293 0.000438 -0.669854 0.5037 
Here, we can see that when a firm enhances its environmental score by one unit, its average 
annual return decreases by -0.000293 percent.  
Table 5: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the average annual returns for the year 2018 
and, as an independent variable, the social scores (4) 
Dependent Variable: Average annual returns in 2018 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.048316 0.031864 1.516307 0.1310 
S scores -0.001039 0.000530 -1.961322 0.0512* 
Looking at the social scores, we can note that when a corporation upgrades its social score by 
one unit, its average annual return will diminish by -0.001039 percent.  
Table 6: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the average annual returns for the year 2018 
and, as an independent variable, the governance scores (5) 
Dependent Variable: Average annual returns in 2018 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.021860 0.046104 0.474160 0.6359 
G scores -0.000557 0.000727 -0.766557 0.4443 
Finally, considering the governance aspect, the fourth regression highlights that when a 
company improves its governance score by one unit, its average annual return decreases by - 
0.000557 percent.  
Up to know, we can so conclude that the sustainability performance of corporations seems to 
go hand in hand with a deterioration of their average annual return. However, the only 
relations being statistically significant are those between the average annual returns and the 
global ESG scores as well as those between the average annual returns and the social scores.  
 
b) Results linked to the potential impact of ESG criteria on market betas 
Here, I will first expose the results of the regressions having as a dependent variable the 
market betas derived from the CAPM and, then, those derived from the Fama-French model. 
This part belongs to our first peripheral analysis and will allow us to get gradually an in-depth 
comprehensiveness of the impact of sustainability on classical pricing models. 
As previously said, beta is a measure of the volatility, or systematic risk, of a security or a 
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portfolio in comparison to the market as a whole. The market beta is therefore of paramount 
importance, hence a section specifically dedicated to analyzing it.  
As we have observed in the literature review, some authors have, over time, investigated the 
potential impact of sustainability on the cost of equity through the beta attached to the 
market premium. To justify the econometric manipulations achieved in this section, three 
papers can especially be put forward.  
In 2014, Gregory et al constructed equally weighted “green” and “toxic” stocks portfolios 
for various CSR indicators143 as well as for a global CSR score. In each case144, they ran the Fama 
and French three-factor model and, then, they compared the market betas of the two 
portfolios. In 2008, Sharfman and Fernando have, for their part, used the CAPM as a measure 
of equity cost of capital. They then used those betas as dependent variables and performed 
OLS regressions having as explanatory variables three control variables145 and, importantly for 
us, an environmental criterion. Finally, Ziegler et al (2007) performed cross-sectional 
regressions that are based on time-series regressions of asset pricing models (CAPM and FF).  
Those papers first justify the fact that both the CAPM and the FF three-factor model can be 
used when analyzing the impact of sustainability on a firm’s market beta. Secondly, the first 
paper underlines that it is useful to investigate both a global sustainable measure as well as 
to analyze individually the different components of this measure. Then, the second paper used 
the beta as dependent variable and especially sustainable data among the explanatory 
variables. The last paper highlight the logic of temporal and transversal investigations. For my  
part, I used the market betas of both pricing models and I analyzed the global ESG score as 
well as the E, S and G scores. I obtained the various market betas thanks to times-series 
regressions and I then performed cross-sectional regressions having as dependent variable 
the betas in question and, as explanatory variables, sustainable data.  
Let us now investigate the regressions’ results attached to CAPM’s betas and sustainable data.  
Note that all tables presented in this section are available in their entirety in Appendix 6 of 
this Master’ s thesis.  
 
 
                                                          
143 Environment, community, product, employee... 
144 Ie: for each CSR indicator as well as for the global CSR score. 
145 The financial leverage, the log-market capitalization and the industry. 
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Table 7: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the ESG scores (9) 
Dependent Variable: Betas CAPM 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.898510 0.183158 4.905644 0.0000*** 
ESG scores 0.000327 0.002952 0.110851 0.9118 
 
Table 8: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the E scores (10) 
Dependent Variable: Betas CAPM 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.679905 0.121927 5.576312 0.0000*** 
E scores 0.003717 0.001861 1.996638 0.0472** 
 
Table 9: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the S scores (11) 
Dependent Variable: Betas CAPM 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.959430 0.137879 6.958482 0.0000*** 
S scores -0.000689 0.002292 -0.300493 0.7641 
Table 10: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the G scores (12) 
Dependent Variable: Betas CAPM 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 1.698942 0.189873 8.947772 0.0000*** 
G scores -0.012391 0.002993 -4.140455 0.0001*** 
 
Table 11: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the CAPM and as 
explanatory variables the E, S and G scores (13) 
Dependent Variable: Betas CAPM 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 1.485204 0.202672 7.328121 0.0000*** 
E scores 0.006325 0.001990 3.178285 0.0017*** 
S scores -0.000473 0.002478 -0.190813 0.8489 
G scores -0.015004 0.003132 -4.790423 0.0000*** 
 
Foremost, it is important to note that all explanations mentioned below are made under the 
assumption of independence between the sustainable data and the error terms.  
Systematic risk is typically macro-economic in nature. Examples include interest rate shocks, 
oil price shocks, economic growth rate shocks and inflation shocks, all of which affect the 
majority of stocks, though some stocks are more exposed to this type of risk than others.  
Some key elements (such as the financial leverage, the operating leverage or even the nature 
of business) affect the beta of a security by making firms more exposed to adverse macro- 
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economic conditions146. As a I did not have the possibility to account for these control variables 
in the following regressions by lack of data’ s availability, their influence on the betas are 
naturally found in the error’ s terms. In order to properly interpret my results, the assumption 
of independence between ESG data and the error’ s terms is thus important.  
If we look at table 7, we see that the p-value attached to the ESG coefficient is extremely high, 
implying that the global ESG scores seems to have no impact on the CAPM’ betas of the 
sample. Given the statistical significance of some results set out just below, this result 
particularly highlights the importance of not only considering an aggregated explanatory 
variable when performing OLS analysis.  
Table 8 indicates that the coefficient of the environmental criterion is positive and statistically 
significant. We can see that, when companies increase their environmental performance of 
one point, their beta increases by 0.003717. More precisely, if firms improve their E score by 
one point, their systematic risk increases by 0.004046213%147 relative to beta’s sample mean. 
The social score has here no impact on firms’ betas; the coefficient attached to the social 
criterion is indeed not statically significant as we can observe in table 9.  
The governance score seems to decrease the beta of firms given the fact its value is negative 
(-0.012391) and highly statically significant whatever the threshold considered. Here, when 
firms improve their G score by one point, their beta decreases by -0.01348846% relative to 
beta’s sample mean. 
Finally, when looking at table 11, we can see that the coefficient of the environmental criterion 
is still negative and even more statistically significant than what as observed in table 8. 
The coefficient related to the governmental score is still negative and also more significant 
than what notified in table 10. In that case, we note that when companies improve their E 
score by one point, their beta increase by 0.0068852% while when enhancing their G score of 
one point, their beta decrease by -0.0163329%. In that case, considering simultaneously the 
E, S and G scores thus seems to improve the quality precision of my model through lower 
standard deviations and thus, higher t-stats.  
                                                          
146 The financial leverage refers to debt taken on by the firm; the more debt a firm takes on, the higher the beta will be in that business. 
The operating leverage is a measure of the proportion of fixed cost to the overall cost. The greater the proportion of fixed costs in the cost 
structure of the business, the higher the beta. Finally, a last important point affecting the beta of a firm is the nature of business. Cyclical 
companies have generally higher betas than non-cyclical firms and discretionary product firms will have higher betas than firms that sell 
less discretionary products. 
147 This percentage is obtained by dividing the coefficient’ value (0.003717) by the mean of the CAPM’ betas. See for instance, Albuquerque 
et al (2014) who proceed exactly this way to interpret the effect of CSR on market’ beta.  
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Now, I will present the results of the regressions having as a dependent variable the market 
betas derived from the Fama and French three-factor model. The three-factor model 
extending the CAPM, it also provides a richer way to model exposure to systematic risk.  
Table 12: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the Fama-French 
three-factor model and as an explanatory variable the ESG scores (9) 
Dependent Variable: Betas FF 3 factor model 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.899333 0.171119 5.255600 0.0000*** 
ESG scores 0.000492 0.002758 0.178340 0.8586 
 
Table 13: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the Fama-French 
 three-factor model and as an explanatory variable the E scores (10) 
Dependent Variable: Betas FF 3 factor model 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.735361 0.114195 6.439497 0.0000*** 
E scores 0.003024 0.001743 1.734386 0.0844* 
 
Table 14: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the Fama-French 
three-factor model and as an explanatory variable the S scores (11) 
Dependent Variable: Betas FF 3 factor model 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.897928 0.128832 6.969781 0.0000*** 
S scores 0.000534 0.002142 0.249568 0.8032 
 
Table 15: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the Fama-French 
three-factor model and as an explanatory variable the G scores (12) 
Dependent Variable: Betas FF 3 factor model 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 1.702010 0.176458 9.645433 0.0000*** 
G scores -0.012266 0.002781 -4.410251 0.0000*** 
 
Table 16: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the Fama-French 
three-factor model and as explanatory variables the E, S and G scores (13) 
Dependent Variable: Betas FF 3 factor model 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 1.476683 0.188765 7.822865 0.0000*** 
E scores 0.004915 0.001854 2.651266 0.0087*** 
S scores 0.001559 0.002308 0.675450 0.5002 
G scores -0.015167 0.002917 -5.199039 0.0000*** 
 
When analyzing the results of the regressions having as dependent variables the market betas 
derived from the Fama-French three-factor model, the results are almost identical to those 
described under the section dedicated to the observation of the CAPM’ market betas. The 
only variables appearing to be statistically significant are once again the environmental and 
governance scores. While the former still increase the beta, the latter ones still appear to 
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lower the market-risk factor.  
From the analyses of the CAPM and FF three-factor’ market betas, we can so conclude that an 
improvement of the environmental score goes hand in hand with an increase of the systematic 
risk while enhancing the governmental performance decreases the beta attached to the 
market premium. A portion of the effects of governance and environment commitment on 
the cost of equity capital thus seems to be captured by firms’ exposure to systematic risk. Beta 
being a key factor in asset pricing models, those results therefore suggest that, through the 
systematic risk channel, environmental leaders face an increase in their cost of equity while 
governance leaders seem to face a decrease in their cost of equity.  
Let us now try to provide some plausible explanations to both aforementioned results. 
Relatively to the influence of governance on beta, Garmaise and Lui (2004) suggested that the 
transfer of decision rights on investment choices to managers exposes shareholders to a more 
levered claim on the market because managers have a taste for actions such as empire 
building (overinvestment) that increases payoffs in good economic times but exaggerates 
losses in bad economic times. The authors derived a prediction that bad corporate governance 
combined with corruption (dishonest management) increases firms’ systematic risk and 
provide empirical support for this prediction in a cross-country empirical test. Hence, within 
the Garmaise and Liu (2004) framework, agency risks associated with the transfer of decision 
rights on investments are, at least in part, captured by beta. In other words, and as a 
suggestive explanation to our result, we can expect that governance mechanisms that foster 
greater monitoring and control of management’s opportunistic actions will impact firms’ cost 
of equity capital indirectly by lowering firms’ exposure to systematic risk. 
In a similar vein, we can suggest that financial information quality can have an influence on 
beta. For example, the more transparent earnings are, the more current earnings reflect 
information about the firm’s current economic activities. More transparent earnings result in 
less information asymmetry between the firm and its shareholders which, in turn, should lead 
to a lower cost of equity capital. This reduction in equity cost may result partly from higher 
quality financial information reducing market risk (Ashbaugh et al (2004)).  
Note that our finding is consistent with the results highlighted in the literature review 
(Remember for instance Ashbaugh et al (2004) or Derwall and Verwijmeren (2007)). 
With respect to the impact the environmental criterion has on market beta, the result is here 
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contrary to what we observed in the literature review. Indeed, papers of Sharfman and 
Fernando (2008) or Salama et al (2011) concluded to an environment commitment inducing 
lower systematic risk. In such views, companies may, for instance, be able to accomplish a 
reduction in beta by implementing environmental risk management operating changes to 
increase their flexibility to manage economic downturns. As an example, firms that have 
invested in clean technology, insulation etc. will be less vulnerable to price increases in energy 
inputs. By reducing the variability in performance, the company will likely reduce its beta, 
which also should lead to lowered equity cost. It is also possible that companies which have 
invested in environmental programs that utilize renewable energy and clean fuels or other 
companies that make great efforts to ensure the optimal quality and safety characteristics of 
their products and services might be better equipped to cope with adverse systematic 
economic shocks than their competitors who are not dedicated to such practices (Oikonomou 
et al (2012)). As another example, it can be advanced that since ESG technology is a product 
differentiation strategy, this implies that green companies face a relatively less price elastic 
demand and can charge higher prices ceteris paribus. From the perspective of a risk-averse 
investor, a company facing a less price elastic demand exhibits lower systematic risk and has 
a higher firm value (Albuquerque et al (2014)). Our results however indicate that 
environmental leaders seem to face have higher systematic risk. One explanation we could 
provide to that respect is that the commitment of a firm to improve its environmental score 
is associated with risk taking. Indeed, the company enters a process of transformation and any 
process of change generates uncertainty. This uncertainty being shared by a large number of 
firms in the market, it could be found in the market risk component of systematic risk. Another 
explanation we can advance is that firms which improve their environmental performance 
may face higher operating costs. Those higher operating costs imply higher risk and, especially, 
higher systematic risk because of firms’ higher vulnerability to price changes, recessions, etc. 
 
c) Results linked to the investigation of sustainability’ s influence on risk-adjusted returns  
In this section, I will first expose the results of the regressions having as a dependent variable 
the alphas derived from the CAPM and I will then expose the regression tables which focus on 
the three-factor alphas. Once again, the results exposed in this section are made under the 
implicit assumption of independence between the sustainability data and the error’ s terms.  
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Before looking at the regressions’ results, it is wise to firstly define precisely what is the alpha 
(also known under the name “Jensen’s alpha” in the CAPM case) and, secondly, to justify, 
given the literature on the subject, the relevance of the regressions outlined below.  
Jensen's measure is in fact a risk-adjusted performance measure that represents the average 
return on a portfolio or investment, above or below that predicted by the CAPM, given the 
portfolio's or investment's beta and the average market return.  
Jensen’s alpha represents the average risk premium per unit of systematic risk. Consequently, 
Jensen’s alpha is an appropriate risk-adjusted measure of portfolio performance for investors 
that are well diversified and, therefore, primarily concerned with their exposure to systematic 
risk. If the CAPM represents the correct equilibrium pricing model, then a statistically 
significant positive alpha would imply superior investment performance and a statistically 
significant negative alpha would imply substandard investment performance relative to a 
naive buy-and-hold investment strategy that includes combinations of the market portfolio 
and the risk-free asset. 
In a sentence, the alpha is therefore simply used to determine the abnormal return of a 
security or portfolio of securities over the theoretical expected return. 
Over the last few years, many papers have investigated the link between sustainability and 
companies’ market-based performance. Most of those papers specifically examined this 
relationship using the CAPM and/or the Fama-French three-factor model. The authors of the 
papers then, most of the time, made various analysis of the inherent alphas.  
Four papers can especially be highlighted to justify the progression of this section. The first 
one is that of Tripathi and Bhandari (2016) which uses both the CAPM and the Fama-French 
three-factor model to analyze the performance of socially responsible stocks portfolio. Then, 
we have the one of Auer and Schuhmacher (2015) which uses the global Sustainalytics ESG 
criterion as well as Sustainalytics E, S or G scores to analyze risk-adjusted performance. Eccles 
(2013) specifically used four-factor alpha as dependent variable in an OLS regression to 
evaluate the impact sustainability has on it. Finally, Ziegler et al (2007) performed cross- 
sectional regressions that are based on time-series regressions of asset pricing models. 
For my part, I used the alphas of both pricing models and I analyzed the global ESG score as 
well as the E, S and G scores. I obtained the various alphas thanks to times-series regressions 
and I then performed cross-sectional regressions having as a dependent variable the alphas in 
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question and, as explanatory variables, sustainable data.  
Let us now turn to the in-depth analysis of the regressions having as a dependent variable the 
alphas derived from the CAPM. Note that all tables presented in this section are available in 
their entirety in Appendix 7 of this Master’ s thesis.  
Table 17: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the ESG scores (14) 
Dependent Variable: Alphas CAPM 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.072076 0.044233 1.629445 0.1048 
ESG scores -0.001176 0.000713 -1.649814 0.1006 
 
Table 18: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the E scores (15) 
Dependent Variable: Alphas CAPM 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.014124 0.029925 0.471984 0.6375 
E scores -0.000224 0.000457 -0.490359 0.6244 
 
Table 19: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the S scores (16) 
Dependent Variable: Alphas CAPM 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.064198 0.033209 1.933181 0.0546* 
S scores -0.001088 0.000552 -1.971556 0.0501* 
 
Table 20: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the G scores (17) 
Dependent Variable: Alphas CAPM 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.053683 0.047970 1.119107 0.2645 
G scores -0.000857 0.000756 -1.133089 0.2585 
 
Table 21: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the CAPM and as 
explanatory variables the E, S and G scores (18) 
Dependent Variable: Alphas CAPM 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.078603 0.052265 1.503950 0.1342 
E scores 0.000261 0.000513 0.508720 0.6115 
S scores -0.001116 0.000639 -1.746791 0.0822* 
G scores -0.000469 0.000808 -0.580556 0.5622 
 
When looking at table 17, we can see that the coefficient related to the ESG scores is negative 
(-0.001176). The p-value associated to this coefficient is statistically not significant although it 
is very close to being at the critical threshold of 10%. 
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In tables 18 and 20, the coefficients related to the environmental and governance scores are 
also negative but far from being statistically significant.  
Interestingly, in table 19, the coefficient inherent in the social criterion appears to be 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The coefficient’s value implies that when firms 
improve their S criterion by one unit, their risk-adjusted return148 decreases by -0.001088%.  
Finally, if we take a look at table 21, we can observe that, when including the E, S and G factors 
simultaneously to explain the alphas, that is once again the social score which appears to have 
an impact on the alphas. Its statistically significant value of -0.001116% is very close to the one 
obtained in table 19.  
This preliminary analysis therefore suggests that companies devoted to enhancing their S 
score have underperformed the market on a risk adjusted basis. From this fact follows two 
lines of investigation. The first one is that the performance gap could result from mispricing; 
financial market participants may so have failed to price social information appropriately. In 
that case, they would have overvalued the returns attached to socially responsible firms 
relative to their laggards’ counterparts over the year 2018. The second one is the following: 
given the fact the social criterion affects the risk-adjusted return, one could also suggest that 
this criterion could eventually be integrated as an additional risk factor to the capital asset 
pricing model.  
Let us now turn to the presentation of the results of the regressions having as a dependent 
variable the alphas derived from the Fama-French three-factor model. 
As previously said, the Fama-French three-factor model is better suited to predict the risk- 
adjusted expected return in the sense it accounts for two additional risks (SMB and HML).  
The three-factor alpha is, consequently, also more refined to perform regressions’ analysis.  
Table 22: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the Fama-French 
three-factor model and as an explanatory variable the ESG scores (14) 
Dependent Variable: Alphas FF 3 factors model 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.073680 0.038274 1.925085 0.0557* 
ESG scores -0.001175 0.000617 -1.905338 0.0582* 
 
                                                          
148 As a reminder, risk is, in the case of CAPM, captured only through market risk.  
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Table 23: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the Fama-French 
three-factor model and as an explanatory variable the E scores (15) 
Dependent Variable: Alphas FF 3 factors model 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.029037 0.025890 1.121539 0.2634 
E scores -0.000430 0.000395 -1.088911 0.2775 
 
Table 24: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the Fama-French 
three-factor model and as an explanatory variable the S scores (16) 
Dependent Variable: Alphas FF 3 factors model 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.048921 0.028878 1.694069 0.0918* 
S scores -0.000802 0.000480 -1.671669 0.0962* 
 
Table 25: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the Fama-French 
three-factor model and as an explanatory variable the G scores (17) 
Dependent Variable: Alphas FF 3 factors model 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.054525 0.041561 1.311925 0.1911 
G scores -0.000844 0.000655 -1.288063 0.1992 
 
Table 26: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the Fama-French 
three-factor model and as explanatory variables the E, S and G scores (18) 
Dependent Variable: Alphas FF 3 factors model 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.077754 0.045430 1.711528 0.0886* 
E scores -0.000124 0.000446 -0.277188 0.7819 
S scores -0.000610 0.000555 -1.098113 0.2735 
G scores -0.000513 0.000702 -0.730452 0.4660 
 
When looking at table 22, we can see that the coefficient of the ESG factor is here, contrary 
to the case of the CAPM analysis, negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. From 
this table we can say that when firms improve their global ESG score by one point, their risk- 
adjusted returns decrease by -0.001175%.  
If we pay attention to tables 23 and 25, the coefficients of the E and G scores are still negative 
but once again non statistically significant. 
The social criterion’s coefficient present in table 24 is still negative (-0.000802) and 
statistically significant. Given the fact that the global ESG score is simply the equally weighted 
average of the three individual scores, it can be supposed that it is the S factor which 
contributes the most to the statistically significance of the ESG global factor in table 22.  
Finally, when looking at table 26, all explanatory variables are still negative but none of them 
is statistically significant. This loss of significance can be explained by the relatively high 
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correlation’ s levels between my E, S and G variables149. As I do incorporate in my model 
variables which appear to be correlated, I deteriorate the quality of precision of it so that 
standard deviations are higher and, consequently, t-stats lower.  
From this analysis, we can observe that two explanatory variables appear to negatively 
influence the three-factor alphas; the ESG factor and the social factor. The social oriented 
firms as well as the ESG committed ones do appear to have underperformed the market on a 
risk-adjusted basis. When analyzing the results linked to the CAPM, we had already identified  
the social criteria as being statically significant when explaining the alphas while the ESG factor 
was extremely close to the 10% threshold.  
The results of the Fama and French three-factor model being even more reliable than the one 
of the CAPM, we can therefore suppose, on the on hand that both ESG and S criteria could 
constitute additional risk factors in traditional asset pricing models or, on the other hand, that 
stock markets did not fully incorporate value-relevant ESG and S information into the stock  
prices over the time period under study. In a nutshell, if we believe in market efficiency, the 
interpretation is that we identify a novel risk factor [e.g., Derwall and Verwijmeren (2007); 
and Lee and Faff (2009)]. If not, it should be interpreting as systematic mispricing of this set of  
assets [e.g., Derwall et al (2005); Kempf and Osthoff (2007); Lee and Faff (2009); and Edmans 
(2011)] 
 
d) Results linked to the core hypothesis of this Master’ s thesis 
We are now going to the results of the regressions linked to the creation of a 4th factor.  
As previously mentioned, I decided to add to the classical Fama and French three-factor model 
a fourth factor being either an ESG factor, an E factor, a S factor or a G factor.  
Before looking at the results attached to those four factor cross-sectional regressions, I found 
it interesting to calculate the means of the returns attached respectively to the high and low 
portfolios. This will further strengthen our intuition about the relationship between the 
average annual return for 2018 and each of the fourth factors.  
In addition to that, I represented on a graph the cumulative returns of the high and low 
sustainable portfolios over the year 2018 (251 days)150. This will allow us to have a visual 
                                                          
149 See table 2 on page 66.  
150 Note that I consider on the graph an initial investment of 1 000 dollars.  
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representation of the return’ gap between the two portfolios under consideration151.  
The means of the returns for the year 2018 take the value of 0.035134398 for the low ESG 
portfolio and the value of -0.00831737 with respect to the high ESG portfolio. We can identify 
a positive premium in favor of the low ESG portfolio. This result could reflect a different risk 
exposure between the two portfolios under consideration. The aforementioned premium is 
also consistent with the statically significant negative correlation we had observed between 
Ri2018 and ESG in table 2. 
When looking at graph 1, we clearly see the gap between the low and high ESG portfolios. 
Graph 1: Cumulative returns of the two ESG portfolios over the year 2018 
 
Note that those results are also consistent with the way we formed our fourth factor. Fama 
and French had identified that values stocks as well as small-cap tended to respectively 
outperform growth and big-cap stocks. Then, in short, they bought their SMB factor by 
subtracting portfolio returns of big caps from portfolio returns of small caps and their HML  
factor by subtracting portfolio returns of growth stocks from portfolio returns of value stocks. 
In a similar vein, we identified that low ESG portfolio returns tend to outperform high ESG 
portfolio returns and we constructed our fourth factor by subtracting high ESG portfolio 
returns from low ESG portfolio returns.  
When calculating the returns’ mean of the high E portfolio, I get a number of - 0.027684803 
while for the low E portfolio I have a value of 0.018421939. Remember that the correlation’s 
                                                          
151 See for instance Görgen et al (2019) who represented also the cumulative returns of BMG and the long and short portfolios. 
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coefficient between Ri2018 and E was also negative, although not statistically significant.  
Graph 2 once again identifies a so-called premium in favor of the low environmental portfolio.  
Graph 2: Cumulative returns of the two E portfolios over the year 2018 
 
The mean of the returns of the low S portfolio is 0.029746887 and those of the high S portfolio 
is - 0.015321905. The related coefficient of correlation present in table 2 was negative and 
statically significant under the 10% threshold.  
Once again, graph 3 allows us to clearly distinguish a gap between the two social portfolios 
over the 251 days under study.  
Graph 3: Cumulative returns of the two S portfolios over the year 2018 
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Finally, when estimating the mean of the returns of the high G portfolio, I get a value of 
0.001227719 and a value of 0.026027549 for the low G portfolio. The gap between the low 
and high portfolios is here lower. Pearson's correlation coefficient was here also negative 
even though not statically significant.  
Thanks to graph 4, we can again visualize the premium inherent in the low governance 
portfolio.  
Graph 4: Cumulative returns of the two G portfolios over the year 2018 
 
 
Let us finally note that given the fact E, S, and G portfolios share the same properties as the 
ESG portfolios (ie: return’s gap beneficial to the low portfolio), the E, S and G fourth factors 
were constructed following the same methodology as the one related to ESG.  
To justify the econometric procedure used to test the core hypothesis of this Master’ s thesis, 
I will highlight three papers that were key when determining the most appropriate way to 
operate the creation of a new sustainable risk factor. Note that all of those three papers have 
been described in detailed in the literature review’ part.  
The three papers in question are: Halbritter and Dorfleitner (2015)’ paper, Jin (2017)’ paper 
and Hübel and Scholz (2019)’ paper.  
Like me, the first two papers focused on the U.S. and performed times-series as well as cross- 
sectional investigations. Then, all of the three papers created sustainable risk factors and 
implemented it in well-known asset pricing models. Finally, the construction of the 
aforementioned risk factors is also similar to the way I have proceed. Indeed, in the first paper 
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the author constructed two portfolios (either ESG, E, S or G ones) based on the 20% best and  
poorest sustainable firms. In a similar vein, we investigated both global as well as individual 
scores and we took the best/poorest deciles of sustainable firms’ ranking. The last paper forms 
its sustainable risk factor taking a long position in firms with low sustainable ratings and a 
short one in firms with high sustainable ratings, exactly as we did.  
Let us now investigate in depth the results linked to equations 23, 24, 25 and 26. Note once 
again, that all tables presented in this section are available in their entirety in Appendix 9 of 
this Master’ s thesis.  
Table 27: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the average annual returns and as 
explanatory variables the estimated betas related to Rm-Rf, SMB, HML and ESG (23) 
Dependent Variable: Average annual returns in 2018 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c -0,005062 0,017356 -0,291660 0,7709 
ß̂im -0,004689 0,016751 -0,279933 0,7798 
ß̂is -0,028861 0,021092 -1,368343 0,1728 
ß̂ih -0,067131 0,008368 -8,022654 0,0000*** 
ß̂iESG 0,057837 0,011552 5,006473 0,0000*** 
 
If we pay attention to the results of this final regression, we mainly have to note that the 
coefficient of ßiesg has a positive value of 0.057837. This is consistent with respect to the 
related risk factor; we indeed expected risk to be at the level of low ESG firms and thus a 
premium in favor of those companies.  
Most importantly, this result is highly statistically significant. The p-value of 0.0000 indeed 
satisfies the three boundaries of statistical significance; namely the border of 10%, that of 5%, 
but also that of 1%. From this table, it thus seems that we have identified a 4th risk factor; 
namely an ESG factor.  
Importantly, our result is consistent with the one of Jin (2017) who bought its ESG-related 
factor the same way we did it and also discovered a significant positive ESG risk premium. Our 
result is also consistent with the findings of Girerd-Potin et al (2014) who showed that 
investors ask for an additional risk premium when they agree to hold low CSR stocks. 
In order to explain such a result, various plausible explanations can be advanced.  
Firstly, Merton (1987)’ s capital market equilibrium model suggests that when the size of a 
firm’ s investor base increases, its cost of equity capital will in turn diminish. Because the fewer 
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the investors, the lower the opportunities for stockholding risk to be diversified. A weak 
demand for stocks having lower sustainable scores will thus lead to higher risk because 
investors require additional premiums as a compensation for the lack of risk sharing 
opportunities (Heinkel et al (2001)). Firms with better sustainable ratings usually having a 
larger base of investors either because of investors’ preferences or reduced information 
asymmetry (El Ghoul et al (2011)). On the one hand, Brammer et al (2006) and Girerd-Potin et 
al (2014) especially showed that investors are not motivated purely by financial returns and 
have the tendency to accept a financial sacrifice to “improve the world”. On the other hand, 
information asymmetry is likely to be more severe for low sustainable firms. Indeed, Dhaliwal 
et al (2011) showed empirically that high sustainable firms tend to disclose more information, 
as these firms want to project their positive image as a responsible corporate citizen to 
investors and other stakeholders. Moreover, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) found that “sin”  
companies receive less coverage from analysts, which implies that analysts and the media are 
more inclined to spend time analyzing and reporting news about “good” firms. Finally, when 
information reaches investors, socially conscious investors are likely to pay more attention to 
information related to high sustainable firms while neglecting information related to low 
sustainable firms. Overall, the relative size of a low sustainable firm’s investor base is lower 
and, consequently, its equity capital cost higher.  
Secondly, we can consider agency theory which advocates that there exists an information 
asymmetry between the agent (i.e.: the manager) and the principal (i.e.: the shareholder). As 
a consequence, the agent may not always act in the best interest of the principal. Given the 
fact that firms with higher ESG ratings tend to disclose more information about their financial 
and extra-financial activities, the information asymmetry is thus attenuated, and equity 
cost is then reduced [e.g., Dhaliwal et al (2011); and Cui et al (2016)].  
Thirdly, ESG firms tend to reduce the variability of cash flows. For instance, investments in ESG 
help develop a company’ s capabilities and processes, and in particular might induce a 
forward-looking corporate culture, which increases the company’ s resilience to business 
cycles and economic shocks (Orlitzky et al (2003)). Such resilience to negative news might also 
stem from the consumer loyalty of socially responsible consumers who more strongly identify 
with ESG companies (Sen and Bhattacharya (2001)). Firms that are responsive to product 
quality and customer needs may also be less likely to encounter product liability suits and 
costly settlements while environmentally responsive firms are less likely to be subjected to 
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environmental fines and lawsuits (Sauer (1997)). Shareholders may require lower return from 
sustainable firms which are considered as less risky due to their higher commitment to legal 
and regulatory rules. By reducing the number of potential claimants on its rents, more of the 
firm’s overall economic resources can in fact be directed strategically to dividends to 
stockholders, internal investments, acquisitions, etc. Each of these activities is likely to be 
rewarded by the market in terms of improved risk perception of the firm from an investment 
standpoint.  
Finally, good corporate citizenship is also likely to create solid firm trust, reputation, brand 
and loyalty. As a result, responsible firms may experience increased product sales. This again 
could reduce investors’ risk perception towards such kinds of companies. The benefits of good 
corporate citizenship need not end with the customer, rather, a firm which cares about 
employee satisfaction and wellbeing may also be in a better position to attract and retain good 
employees. Advocates of social-responsibility investing argue that employee loyalty benefits 
a firm by improving productivity, innovation, lowering production costs, and thereby 
enhancing profitability (McGuire et al (1988)). On the environmental side, firms which 
minimize the negative environmental impacts of their products and processes, recycle post- 
consumer waste, and establish environmental management systems reduce costs from 
materials waste, energy consumption and inefficient processes and prevent environmental 
spills or even management time directed at clean-up and remediation. Green firms are also 
more prone to attract customers and expand their markets or displace competitors that fail 
to promote strong environmental performance (Salama et al 2011).  
All in all, those underlined facts would once again lead to a reduced required return towards 
socially responsible firms considered as potentially more profitable, reliable and suited to 
future development.  
The four aforementioned arguments imply that, ceteris paribus, high ESG firms have lower 
costs of equity capital than their low counterparts (El Ghoul et al (2011)). This reasoning is in 
line with results obtained in the fourth tables of this section.  
Let us now investigate the results obtained when specifically creating an environmental, social 
or governance fourth factor. 
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Table 28: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the average annual returns and as 
explanatory variables the estimated betas related to Rm-Rf, SMB, HML and E (24) 
Dependent Variable: Average annual returns in 2018 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c -0.026341 0.019342 -1.361841 0.1748 
ß̂im 0.009712 0.018216 0.533157 0.5945 
ß̂is -0.046246 0.022142 -2.08863 0.0380** 
ß̂ih -0.067065 0.008515 -7.875726 0.0000*** 
ß̂iE 0.046097 0.012114 3.805235 0.0002*** 
If we look at the environmental aspect, we most importantly have to highlight that the 
coefficient attached to ß̂iE is also positive and highly statistically significant.  
From this table, we can advance that the environmental factor can also be considered as a 
specific risk factor on its own.  
Interestingly our result is once again consistent with another paper; the one of Görgen et al 
(2019) who developed a carbon risk factor and underlined its relevance as an additional risk 
factor in an asset pricing perspective.  
Table 29: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the average annual returns and as 
explanatory variables the estimated betas related to Rm-Rf, SMB, HML and S (25) 
Dependent Variable: Average annual returns in 2018 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.010910 0.017521 0.622715 0.5342 
ß̂im -0.022650 0.016831 -1.345699 0.1800 
ß̂is -0.024571 0.021185 -1.159825 0.2475 
ß̂ih -0.068238 0.008409 -8.114814 0.0000*** 
ß̂iS 0.063062 0.012189 5.173739 0.0000*** 
The social criterion also seems to be an important risk factor; its p-value is extremely 
significant, and its related premium is the highest among the four regressions presented in 
this section152.  
Interestingly, the premiums attached to the ESG and S factors are much higher compared to 
the one of the E and G factors. The ESG and S p-values are also in both cases equal to 0. We 
could link those results to the results highlighted at the very end of the section dedicated to 
the development of the Fama-French risk-adjusted returns. From this analysis, we notified 
that ESG and S factors significantly negatively influenced the alphas153. Considering the market 
                                                          
152 The coefficient attached to the ß̂iS risk factor (0.063062) is indeed the largest among the four regressions performed.  
153 See tables 22 and 24 on pages 79 and 80.  
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as efficient, those results suggested that specific ESG and S factors could be added to the three 
traditional risk factors. By transforming this information into new risk factors154 in the classical 
Fama-French model, we indeed see that their related premium are high and highly statistically 
significant.  
Table 30: Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the average annual returns and as 
explanatory variables the estimated betas related to Rm-Rf, SMB, HML and G (26) 
Dependent Variable: Average annual returns in 2018 
Included observations: 200 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c 0.037827 0.025250 1.498090 0.1357 
ß̂im -0.050232 0.024792 -2.026111 0.0441 
ß̂is -0.030721 0.021896 -1.403051 0.1622 
ß̂ih -0.068093 0.008678 -7.846729 0.0000*** 
ß̂iG 0.019953 0.011386 1.752373 0.0813* 
Finally, we just have to analyze the governance criterion. Once again, the premium attached 
to the fourth factor is positive and statistically significant although it is the lowest of the four 
sustainable premiums. Moreover, the premium here only holds under the 10% threshold.  
The fact that the premium of the governance factor is the lowest and that its p-value is the 
highest155 could partially be explained by the fact that this factor already had an extremely 
significant impact on the market beta, as notified in tables 10 and 15.  
Interestingly, the results achieved throughout this study with respect to the governance 
criterion are consistent with those of Ashbaugh et al (2004) who shed in light that governance 
affects equity cost both directly (fourth factor) and indirectly (market beta).   
Overall, our results are also consistent with Hübel and Scholz (2019) who indicated that the E 
factor, the S one as well as the G one contribute to the explanatory power of traditional pricing 
models.  
For information, relatively to the fact that the coefficient attached to the estimated HML risk 
factor is in each case statistically significant, it can be deduced that this variable has an 
important role when explaining the average annual return in my sample. When looking at 
correlation tables available in Appendix 10, we can see that this factor has relatively low 
correlations with respect to the three other ones. This reinforces all the more the predictive 
character of this factor. The coefficient attached to it is always negative, whatever the fourth 
                                                          
154 In this particular case, a factor ESG or S. 
155 Among the four 4th factors created. 
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factor considered. It is thus obvious that my sample has a tilt towards growth stocks during 
the period examined.  
When considering the market-risk premia, those are in neither case statistically significant. To 
explain such a result, it is once again important to look at the four correlation tables and to 
note the extremely strong correlation this factor has particularly with the SMB factor. This 
causes a loss of precision in our four specifications and it thus systematically lowers t-stats for 
these two variables.  
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Conclusion 
 
Dealing with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues is increasingly expected of 
firms to succeed in today’s world. Megatrends such as climate change, population growth and 
natural resources’ disappearance create risks that require companies to deal with ESG issues 
in a serious way. In such a changing environment, many academic papers have investigated  
what the consequences of responsible investing are for firms and investors. The main question 
has been whether sustainable investing pays off in one way or another. With that respect, 
research has especially been conducted to show the impact ESG commitment has on a firm’ s 
cost of equity capital. Facing such a question, most of scholars reached the conclusion that 
“Companies embracing ESG criteria face lower equity cost”.  
In line with these studies, I essentially performed OLS regressions which look at the relevance 
of incorporating ESG criteria from a company perspective and focus on the cost of equity. 
In a more detailed way, I first investigated the potential impact sustainability has on well- 
known market betas and risk-adjusted returns. With that respect, I found that 
environmentally friendly firms face a higher systematic risk than firms having poor 
environmental scores while well-governed companies enjoy a lower systematic risk than 
poorly governed companies. Looking at risk-adjusted returns enables us, on the one hand, to 
inform investors about the apparent risk-adjusted underperformance of social and ESG firms  
compared to the market and, on the other hand, to consider (under the hypothesis of 
market efficiency) an omitted sustainable risk factor in an asset pricing perspective.  
After such preliminary analyses, I investigated the key question of this Master’ s thesis, that 
is: “Does it make sense to incorporate an ESG risk factor in the traditional FF equity pricing 
model?”. To answer this question, I have constructed four different ESG risk factors (ESG, E, S 
and G) to quantify the sustainable risk exposures of firms. Thanks to the construction of those 
sustainable risk factors and the addition of them into the famous Fama-French three-factor 
model, I found that market participants charge a statistically significant higher sustainable risk 
premiums to firms having poor sustainable scores. Those new factors thus appear to push 
upward the equity cost of non-green companies. As a whole, ESG criteria therefore appear to 
be relevant to investors and financial markets look like rewarding ESG performance. 
92 
 
Such a result could be explained by both investor base and risk channels. The first channel 
essentially says that unsustainable firms have a restricted investor base due to investor 
preferences for green companies as well as a higher information asymmetry. Poor sustainable 
companies thus have to offer their shareholders higher expected returns to compensate them  
for the lack of risk sharing. The second channel, that is, the risk one, advances that higher 
returns might be a premium that investors earn for the displeasure of holdings poor 
sustainable stocks, possibly as a compensation for the additional risks these stocks exhibit. 
The lower risk inherent in high ESG firms can happen because they have happier, more stable 
employees, lower fines, good production levels, and all the other business-related virtues 
bestowed on leading ESG firms. 
Notwithstanding, this study is obviously not free from certain limitations. One of the most 
important failures of this Master’ s thesis is that it is limited to the year 2018; such a short 
period of time may indeed easily induce biased results. Moreover, my sample is limited to two 
thousand companies. It could be argued it is too restrictive to draw reliable results when 
performing regressions.  
The results of this study also suggest some other aspects might be worth considering for future 
research. Firstly, it would be wise to use ESG data from another data provider (For 
example, Bloomberg or Thomson Reuters). Indeed, and as underlined by Halbritter and 
Dorfleitner (2015), most papers focus on one special ESG rating database, but it is possible 
that implications related to returns are dependent on the underlying rating approach. 
Secondly, in this paper we focus on the US context, but it might be fruitful to extend the 
study to other contexts. As an example, given that Europe accounts for over half of the 
assets managed sustainably worldwide according to Global Sustainable Investment Alliance 
GSIA (2017), it would be very interesting to replicate the study using European data. Thirdly, 
it would be interesting to reproduce the same econometric manipulations performed in this 
Master’ s thesis under another pricing model to see if our core results still hold under 
another pricing specification (For example, to add the sustainable fourth factor in the Fama- 
French five-factor model). Finally, it would be wise to check endogeneity issues. For  
example, it would be wise to extend the time period under study in order to investigate the 
reverse causality of my key result, that is: “Do firms with low equity costs spend more money 
to enhance their ESG performance?”.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Detailed description of some concepts discussed in this work 
 
➢ The UN Global Compact 
The UN Global Compact is the world's largest corporate sustainability initiative. It is in fact a 
voluntary initiative based on CEO commitments to implement universal sustainability 
principles and to take steps to support UN goals. Gathering 34 participants on July 26, 2000, 
the initiative now has more than 13,000 signatories in over 160 countries, both developed and  
developing, representing nearly every sector and size. 
➢ The United Nations backed Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI) 
The United Nations-supported Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) Initiative is an 
international network of investors working together to put the six Principles for Responsible 
Investment into practice. Its goal is to understand the implications of sustainability for 
investors and support signatories to incorporate these issues into their investment decision 
making and ownership practices. In implementing the Principles, signatories contribute to the 
development of a more sustainable global financial system. With 90 participants at the end of 
2006, the UN PRI no gathers more than 2,300 signatories.  
➢ The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
GRI is an independent international organization that has pioneered sustainability reporting 
since 1997. GRI helps businesses and governments worldwide understand and communicate 
their impact on critical sustainability issues such as climate change, human rights, governance 
and social well-being. This enables real action to create social, environmental and economic 
benefits for everyone. The GRI Sustainability Reporting Standards are developed with true 
multi-stakeholder contributions and rooted in the public interest.  
➢ The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 
CDP is a not-for-profit charity that runs the global disclosure system for investors, companies, 
cities, states and regions to manage their environmental impacts. Over the past 15 years it has 
created a system that has resulted in unparalleled engagement on environmental issues 
worldwide. There are now companies, cities, states and regions from over 90 countries that 
disclose through CDP. 
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➢ The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) 
SASB was founded in 2011 by Jean Rogers, who originated the concept and served as the 
organization’s first CEO. SASB is a non-profit that seeks to create industry sustainability 
standards for the disclosure and recognition of financially material environmental, social, and 
governance impacts of publicly traded US companies. 
➢ The European Sustainable Investment Forum (Eurosif) 
The European Sustainable Investment Forum is a European network dedicated to promoting 
the integration of ESG criteria into financial management, mainly through lobbying European 
institutions, publishing research reports and organizing events for raise investor awareness of 
ESG issues. Eurosif is a non-profit organization that was founded in 2001 to promote Socially 
Responsible Investment throughout Europe. It is the European reference organization for the 
development of responsible investment practices. 
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Appendix 2: Meta-studies, reports and literature reviews on CP and sustainability 
 
Meta-studies 
Sampling 52 US empirical studies that span 30 years of research, Orlitzky et al (2003) 
demonstrated namely that corporate social performance and financial performance are 
generally positively related across a wide variety of industry and study contexts. They also put 
in light that there is a kind of virtuous cycle (so, a bidirectional causality) between corporate 
social performance and financial performance156. Margolis et al (2007) analyzed 167 studies 
from 1972 through 2007 and concluded that there is a mildly positive relationship between 
corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP). Gossling and 
Van Beurden (2008) evaluated 34 studies which investigate corporate social and financial 
performance. Among them, 68% find a positive relationship between CSP and CFP, 26% show 
no significant relationship and 6% show a negative relationship. Russell Crook et al (2011) 
investigated 66 studies through their so called “human capital and firm performance meta- 
analysis”. Overall, their results suggest that human capital relates strongly to performance. 
More recently, Friede et al (2015) investigated more than 2200 empirical studies. Hence, this 
paper is by far the most exhaustive overview of academic research on this subject. The authors 
found that the business case for ESG investing is empirically very well founded. Indeed, 
roughly 90% of studies find a nonnegative ESG–CFP relation. Most importantly, the vast 
majority of studies reports positive findings. In the same year, Oxford University and 
Arabesque Partners published a meta-study called “From the Stockholder to the Stakeholder; How 
Sustainability Can Drive Financial Outperformance”. This meta-study categorized more than 200 
sources, including academic studies, industry reports, newspaper articles and books. 
Relatively to sustainability and its relation to financial market performance, 80% of their 
studies document a positive correlation between good sustainability and superior financial 
market performance while 88% of the research shows that solid ESG practices result in better 
operational performance of firms. 
 
 
 
                                                          
156 The relationship tends so to be bidirectional and simultaneous. 
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Reports and literature reviews  
“Sustainable Investing: Establishing Long-Term Value and Performance” is an important 
literature review which was done by DB Climate Change Advisors in 2012. The authors 
performed one of the most comprehensive reviews of the literature ever undertaken. One of 
the main conclusions they reached is that ESG criteria go hand in hand with superior risk- 
adjusted returns at a securities level. In 2007, Mercer published “Demystifying Responsible 
Investment Performance”, a joint report with the AMWG UNEP FI157. This report highlighted 
20 papers examining the relation between ESG issues and financial performance. In 2009, 
Mercer issued another report (“Shedding Light on Responsible Investment: Approaches, 
Returns and Impacts”), in which he reviewed a further 16 academic studies on ESG and 
financial performance that were published after the AMWG UNEP FI/Mercer joint report. 
Pooling those results with the 2007 report, there are 36 studies in total: 20 studies highlighting 
a positive relation, 2 showing evidence of a neutral/positive relation, 3 reaching the conclusion 
of a negative/neutral relation, 8 showing a neutral relation and only 3 clearly indicating a 
negative relation.  In July 2017, Nuveen TIAA Investments released a report called 
”Responsible Investing: Delivering Competitive Performance”. The authors selected five widely 
known U.S. equity RI indexes with track records of at least 10 years158 as well as two famous 
U.S. equity-based indexes159. As a whole, they found no statistical difference in RI index returns 
compared to the two broad market benchmarks. Moreover, with standard deviations of 
returns and Sharpe ratios comparable between RI indexes and benchmarks, this suggests that 
incorporating ESG criteria in investment decisions does not require taking on additional risk 
relative to broad market benchmarks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
157 Asset Management Working Group of the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative. 
158 The Calvert U.S. Large Cap Core Responsible Index, the Dow Jones Sustainability U.S. Index, the FTSE4Good US Index, the MSCI KLD 400 
Social Index and the MSCI USA IMI ESG Leaders Index. 
159 The Russell 3000 and S&P 500 indexes. 
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Appendix 3: Overview of the two thousand companies belonging to the sample 
 
Enterprise Sector 
  
1. Oneok Energy 
2. TE Connectivity Technology 
3. Moody’s Financial Services 
4. Waste Management Industrials 
5. Micron Technology Technology 
6. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Healthcare 
7. Norfolk Southern Industrials 
8. Schlumberger Energy 
9. 3M Industrials 
10. AT&T Communication Services 
11. Visa Financial Services 
12. Walt Disney Consumer Cyclical 
13. Coca-Cola Consumer Defensive 
14. Home Depot Consumer Cyclical 
15. PepsiCo Consumer Defensive 
16. Philip Morris International  Consumer Defensive 
17. Gilead Sciences Healthcare 
18. U.S. Bancorp Financial Services 
19. ConocoPhillips Energy 
20. Caterpillar Industrials 
21. CVS Health Healthcare 
22. Amazon Consumer Cyclical 
23. Microsoft Technology 
24. Apple Technology 
25. Berkshire Hathaway Financial Services 
26. Facebook Technology 
27. Johnson & Johnson Healthcare 
28. JPMorgan Chase Financial Services 
29. Exxon Mobil Energy 
30. Bank of America Financial Services 
31. Pfizer Healthcare 
32. Procter & Gamble Consumer Defensive 
33. Wells Fargo & Company Financial Services 
34. Chevron Energy 
35. Verizon Communications Communication Services 
36. Intel Technology 
37. Mastercard Financial Services 
38. Boeing Industrials 
39. Cisco Systems Technology 
40. Merck & Co Healthcare 
41. Oracle Technology 
42. Comcast Communication Services 
43. Citigroup Financial Services 
44. Netflix Consumer Cyclical 
45. McDonald's Consumer Cyclical 
46. Nike Consumer Cyclical 
47. Eli Lilly Healthcare 
48. Abbott Laboratories Healthcare 
49. DowDuPont Basic Materials 
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50. IBM Technology 
51. AbbVie Healthcare 
52. Adobe Technology 
53. Salesforce Technology 
54. Amgen Healthcare 
55. Medtronic  Healthcare 
56. Union Pacific Industrials 
57. Broadcom Technology 
58. Honeywell International Industrials 
59. PayPal Holdings Financial Services 
60. United Technologies Industrials 
61. Accenture Technology 
62. Thermo Fisher Scientific Healthcare 
63. Texas Instruments Incorporated Technology 
64. Costco Wholesale Consumer Defensive 
65. Altria Group Consumer Defensive 
66. General Electric Industrials 
67. NVIDIA Technology 
68. American Express Financial Services 
69. Booking Holdings Consumer Cyclical 
70. NextEra Energy Utilities 
71. Starbucks Consumer Cyclical 
72. Lockheed Martin Industrials 
73. Bristol-Myers Squibb Healthcare 
74. Anthem Healthcare 
75. Charter Communications Communication Services 
76. Lowe’s Companies Consumer Cyclical 
77. Danaher Healthcare 
78. American Tower Communication Services 
79. Cigna Healthcare 
80. The Goldman Sachs Group Financial Services 
81. Morgan Stanley Financial Services 
82. Walgreens Boots Alliance Consumer Defensive 
83. Biogen Healthcare 
84. Becton, Dickinson and Company Healthcare 
85. Stryker Healthcare 
86. Mondelez International Consumer Defensive 
87. Blackrock Financial Services 
88. Charles Schwab Financial Services 
89. Duke Energy Utilities 
90. Automatic Data Processing Industrials 
91. Chubb Financial Services 
92. Celgene Healthcare 
93. The TJX Companies Consumer Cyclical 
94. Qualcomm Technology 
95. Intuitive Surgical Healthcare 
96. Simon Property Group Real Estate 
97. Kraft Heinz Consumer Defensive 
98. EOG Resources Energy 
99. The PNC Financial Services Group Financial Services 
100. Intuit Technology 
101. CSX Industrials 
102. Colgate-Palmolive Consumer Defensive 
103. Dominion Energy Utilities 
104. General Motors Consumer Cyclical 
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105. Deere & Company Industrials 
106. Boston Scientific Healthcare 
107. Bank of New York Mellon Financial Services 
108. General Dynamics Industrials 
109. Occidental Petroleum Energy 
110. Southern Utilities 
111. Raytheon Industrials 
112. The Estée Lauder Companies Consumer Defensive 
113. Crown Castle International Real Estate 
114. S&P Global Financial Services 
115. Vertex Pharmaceuticals Healthcare 
116. FedEx Industrials 
117. Northrop Grumman Industrials 
118. Allergan Healthcare 
119. Marsh & McLennan companies Financial Services 
120. Ecolab Basic Materials 
121. Illinois Tool Works Industrials 
122. Exelon Utilities 
123. MetLife Financial Services 
124. Intercontinental Exchange Financial Services 
125. Prologis Real Estate 
126. Zoetis Healthcare 
127. Emerson Electric Industrials 
128. Humana Healthcare 
129. Illumina Healthcare 
130. Cognizant Technology Solutions Technology 
131. Kinder Morgan Energy 
132. Carnival Consumer Cyclical 
133. Marriott International Consumer Cyclical 
134. Sherwin-Williams Basic Materials 
135. American Electric Power Utilities 
136. Prudential Financial Financial Services 
137. Baxter International Healthcare 
138. Capital One Financial Financial Services 
139. Target Consumer Defensive 
140. BB&T Financial Services 
141. Applied Materials Technology 
142. Analog Devices Technology 
143. Air Products & Chemicals Basic Materials 
144. Aflac Incorporated Financial Services 
145. Activision Blizzard Technology 
146. Valero Energy Energy 
147. Public Storage Real Estate 
148. Fidelity National Information Services Industrials 
149. Edwards Lifesciences Healthcare 
150. HP Technology 
151. Ford Motor Consumer Cyclical 
152. Delta Air Lines Industrials 
153. Ross Stores Consumer Cyclical 
154. Sysco Consumer Defensive 
155. Fiserv Industrials 
156. Lyondellbasell Industries Basic Materials 
157. Eaton Industrials 
158. The Travelers Companies Financial Services 
159. Autodesk Technology 
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160. The Williams Companies Energy 
161. Southwest Airlines Industrials 
162. eBay Consumer Cyclical 
163. Sempra Energy Utilities 
164. Monster Beverage Consumer Defensive 
165. Equinix Real Estate 
166. Red Hat Industrials 
167. Johnson Controls International Industrials 
168. Roper Technologies Industrials 
169. Allstate Financial Services 
170. Dollar General Consumer Defensive 
171. Welltower Real Estate 
172. Halliburton Energy 
173. Xilinx Technology 
174. Electronic Arts Technology 
175. Royal Caribbean Cruises Consumer Cyclical 
176. Public Service Enterprise Group 
Incorporated 
Utilities 
177. Alexion Pharmaceuticals Healthcare 
178. Amphenol Technology 
179. Equity Residential Real Estate 
180. Xcel Energy Utilities 
181. AvalonBay Communities Real Estate 
182. Corning Incorporated Technology 
183. General Mills Consumer Defensive 
184. SunTrust Banks Financial Services 
185. Lam Research Technology 
186. Paychex Industrials 
187. IQVIA Holdings Healthcare 
188. Fortive Technology 
189. PPP Industries Basic Materials 
190. Ingersoll-Rand Industrials 
191. Republic Services Industrials 
192. McKesson Healthcare 
193. Zimmer Biomet Holdings Healthcare 
194. Agilent Technologies Healthcare 
195. United Continental Holdings Industrials 
196. Cummins Industrials 
197. WEC Energy Group Utilities 
198. Twenty-First Century Fox Consumer cyclical 
199. Alphabet Technology 
200. Centene Healthcare 
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Appendix 4: Cross-sectional regressions having as a dependent variable the average 
annual returns for the year 2018 and, as an independent variable, sustainable data 
 
Equation used to run cross-sectional regressions having as a dependent variable the average 2018 returns (Ri2018) 
and, as an independent variable, the ESG scores (Equation 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Equation used to run cross-sectional regressions having as a dependent variable the average 2018 returns (Ri2018) 
and, as an independent variable, the E scores (Equation 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
Equation used to run cross-sectional regressions having as a dependent variable the average 2018 returns (Ri2018) 
and, as an independent variable, the S scores (Equation 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
Equation used to run cross-sectional regressions having as a dependent variable the average 2018 returns (Ri2018) 
and, as an independent variable, the G scores (Equation 5) 
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Appendix 5: Example of the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor time-series 
regressions’ results obtained for a given company (Abbott Laboratories) 
 
CAPM (Equation 7) 
 
 
 
 
 
Fama and French three-factor model (Equation 8) 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: EXCESS_RET_AL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/19   Time: 15:32
Sample: 1 251
Included observations: 251
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.120261 0.053094 2.265055 0.0244
RM_RF__251_OBSERVATIONS_ 1.044367 0.048842 21.38238 0.0000
R-squared 0.647412     Mean dependent var 0.097335
Adjusted R-squared 0.645996     S.D. dependent var 1.413482
S.E. of regression 0.840997     Akaike info criterion 2.499479
Sum squared resid 176.1117     Schwarz criterion 2.527570
Log likelihood -311.6846     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.510784
F-statistic 457.2063     Durbin-Watson stat 1.829038
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: EXCESS_RET_AL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/19   Time: 15:33
Sample: 1 251
Included observations: 251
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.104208 0.052377 1.989576 0.0477
RM_RF__251_OBSERVATIONS_ 0.991514 0.051815 19.13558 0.0000
SMB__251_OBSERVATIONS_ -0.301214 0.102321 -2.943808 0.0036
HML__251_OBSERVATIONS_ -0.259528 0.102096 -2.542000 0.0116
R-squared 0.663135     Mean dependent var 0.097335
Adjusted R-squared 0.659044     S.D. dependent var 1.413482
S.E. of regression 0.825352     Akaike info criterion 2.469795
Sum squared resid 168.2580     Schwarz criterion 2.525978
Log likelihood -305.9593     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.492405
F-statistic 162.0775     Durbin-Watson stat 1.823024
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Appendix 6: Tables of the cross-sectional regressions having as a dependent variable 
the market betas and, as an independent variable, the sustainable data 
 
Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the ESG scores (Equation 9) 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the E scores (Equation 10) 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: BETA_CAPM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:16
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.898510 0.183158 4.905644 0.0000
ESG_SCORES 0.000327 0.002952 0.110851 0.9118
R-squared 0.000062     Mean dependent var 0.918637
Adjusted R-squared -0.004988     S.D. dependent var 0.340162
S.E. of regression 0.341009     Akaike info criterion 0.696133
Sum squared resid 23.02484     Schwarz criterion 0.729117
Log likelihood -67.61334     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.709481
F-statistic 0.012288     Durbin-Watson stat 1.867876
Prob(F-statistic) 0.911847
Dependent Variable: BETA_CAPM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:17
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.679905 0.121927 5.576312 0.0000
E_SCORES 0.003717 0.001861 1.996638 0.0472
R-squared 0.019737     Mean dependent var 0.918637
Adjusted R-squared 0.014786     S.D. dependent var 0.340162
S.E. of regression 0.337637     Akaike info criterion 0.676261
Sum squared resid 22.57181     Schwarz criterion 0.709245
Log likelihood -65.62613     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.689609
F-statistic 3.986563     Durbin-Watson stat 1.884696
Prob(F-statistic) 0.047234
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Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the S scores (Equation 11) 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the G scores (Equation 12) 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: BETA_CAPM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:18
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.959430 0.137879 6.958482 0.0000
S_SCORES -0.000689 0.002292 -0.300493 0.7641
R-squared 0.000456     Mean dependent var 0.918637
Adjusted R-squared -0.004592     S.D. dependent var 0.340162
S.E. of regression 0.340942     Akaike info criterion 0.695740
Sum squared resid 23.01578     Schwarz criterion 0.728723
Log likelihood -67.57396     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.709087
F-statistic 0.090296     Durbin-Watson stat 1.863742
Prob(F-statistic) 0.764117
Dependent Variable: BETA_CAPM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:19
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.698942 0.189873 8.947772 0.0000
G_SCORES -0.012391 0.002993 -4.140455 0.0001
R-squared 0.079683     Mean dependent var 0.918637
Adjusted R-squared 0.075035     S.D. dependent var 0.340162
S.E. of regression 0.327151     Akaike info criterion 0.613158
Sum squared resid 21.19146     Schwarz criterion 0.646141
Log likelihood -59.31579     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.626506
F-statistic 17.14337     Durbin-Watson stat 1.868853
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000051
114 
 
Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the CAPM and as explanatory 
variables the E, S and G scores (Equation 13) 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the Fama-French three factors 
model and as an explanatory variable the ESG scores (Equation 9) 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: BETA_CAPM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:20
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.485204 0.202672 7.328121 0.0000
E_SCORES 0.006325 0.001990 3.178285 0.0017
S_SCORES -0.000473 0.002478 -0.190813 0.8489
G_SCORES -0.015004 0.003132 -4.790423 0.0000
R-squared 0.130394     Mean dependent var 0.918637
Adjusted R-squared 0.117084     S.D. dependent var 0.340162
S.E. of regression 0.319628     Akaike info criterion 0.576480
Sum squared resid 20.02378     Schwarz criterion 0.642446
Log likelihood -53.64801     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.603176
F-statistic 9.796500     Durbin-Watson stat 1.887353
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000005
Dependent Variable: BETA_FF
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:29
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.899333 0.171119 5.255600 0.0000
ESG_SCORES 0.000492 0.002758 0.178340 0.8586
R-squared 0.000161     Mean dependent var 0.929585
Adjusted R-squared -0.004889     S.D. dependent var 0.317818
S.E. of regression 0.318594     Akaike info criterion 0.560150
Sum squared resid 20.09739     Schwarz criterion 0.593133
Log likelihood -54.01497     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.573497
F-statistic 0.031805     Durbin-Watson stat 1.893102
Prob(F-statistic) 0.858638
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Cross sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the Fama-French three factor 
model and as an explanatory variable the E scores (Equation 10) 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the Fama-French three factor 
model and as an explanatory variable the S scores (Equation 11) 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: BETA_FF
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:29
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.735361 0.114195 6.439497 0.0000
E_SCORES 0.003024 0.001743 1.734386 0.0844
R-squared 0.014965     Mean dependent var 0.929585
Adjusted R-squared 0.009990     S.D. dependent var 0.317818
S.E. of regression 0.316226     Akaike info criterion 0.545232
Sum squared resid 19.79981     Schwarz criterion 0.578215
Log likelihood -52.52322     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.558580
F-statistic 3.008095     Durbin-Watson stat 1.914409
Prob(F-statistic) 0.084406
Dependent Variable: BETA_FF
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:30
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.897928 0.128832 6.969781 0.0000
S_SCORES 0.000534 0.002142 0.249568 0.8032
R-squared 0.000314     Mean dependent var 0.929585
Adjusted R-squared -0.004734     S.D. dependent var 0.317818
S.E. of regression 0.318569     Akaike info criterion 0.559996
Sum squared resid 20.09430     Schwarz criterion 0.592979
Log likelihood -53.99958     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.573344
F-statistic 0.062284     Durbin-Watson stat 1.893950
Prob(F-statistic) 0.803180
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Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the Fama-French three factor 
model and as an explanatory variable the G scores (Equation 12) 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional regressions having as a dependent variable the betas derived from the Fama-French three factor 
model and as explanatory variables the E, S and G scores (Equation 13) 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: BETA_FF
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:31
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.702010 0.176458 9.645433 0.0000
G_SCORES -0.012266 0.002781 -4.410251 0.0000
R-squared 0.089447     Mean dependent var 0.929585
Adjusted R-squared 0.084848     S.D. dependent var 0.317818
S.E. of regression 0.304036     Akaike info criterion 0.466607
Sum squared resid 18.30268     Schwarz criterion 0.499590
Log likelihood -44.66070     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.479955
F-statistic 19.45031     Durbin-Watson stat 1.863377
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000017
Dependent Variable: BETA_FF
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:31
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.476683 0.188765 7.822865 0.0000
E_SCORES 0.004915 0.001854 2.651266 0.0087
S_SCORES 0.001559 0.002308 0.675450 0.5002
G_SCORES -0.015167 0.002917 -5.199039 0.0000
R-squared 0.135843     Mean dependent var 0.929585
Adjusted R-squared 0.122616     S.D. dependent var 0.317818
S.E. of regression 0.297696     Akaike info criterion 0.434309
Sum squared resid 17.37009     Schwarz criterion 0.500276
Log likelihood -39.43093     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.461005
F-statistic 10.27022     Durbin-Watson stat 1.896108
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000003
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Appendix 7: Tables of the cross-sectional regressions having as a dependent variable 
the risk-adjusted returns and, as an independent variable, the sustainable data 
 
Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the ESG scores (Equation 14) 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the E scores (Equation 15) 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ALPHA_CAPM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/31/19   Time: 21:53
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.072076 0.044233 1.629445 0.1048
ESG_SCORES -0.001176 0.000713 -1.649814 0.1006
R-squared 0.013560     Mean dependent var -0.000266
Adjusted R-squared 0.008578     S.D. dependent var 0.082710
S.E. of regression 0.082355     Akaike info criterion -2.145608
Sum squared resid 1.342901     Schwarz criterion -2.112625
Log likelihood 216.5608     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.132260
F-statistic 2.721885     Durbin-Watson stat 1.880691
Prob(F-statistic) 0.100567
Dependent Variable: ALPHA_CAPM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/31/19   Time: 21:55
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.014124 0.029925 0.471984 0.6375
E_SCORES -0.000224 0.000457 -0.490359 0.6244
R-squared 0.001213     Mean dependent var -0.000266
Adjusted R-squared -0.003831     S.D. dependent var 0.082710
S.E. of regression 0.082869     Akaike info criterion -2.133168
Sum squared resid 1.359711     Schwarz criterion -2.100185
Log likelihood 215.3168     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.119821
F-statistic 0.240452     Durbin-Watson stat 1.892086
Prob(F-statistic) 0.624423
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Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the S scores (Equation 16) 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the CAPM and as an 
explanatory variable the G scores (Equation 17) 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ALPHA_CAPM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/31/19   Time: 21:58
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.064198 0.033209 1.933181 0.0546
S_SCORES -0.001088 0.000552 -1.971556 0.0501
R-squared 0.019254     Mean dependent var -0.000266
Adjusted R-squared 0.014300     S.D. dependent var 0.082710
S.E. of regression 0.082117     Akaike info criterion -2.151396
Sum squared resid 1.335151     Schwarz criterion -2.118413
Log likelihood 217.1396     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.138048
F-statistic 3.887034     Durbin-Watson stat 1.906166
Prob(F-statistic) 0.050053
Dependent Variable: ALPHA_CAPM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/31/19   Time: 22:00
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.053683 0.047970 1.119107 0.2645
G_SCORES -0.000857 0.000756 -1.133089 0.2585
R-squared 0.006443     Mean dependent var -0.000266
Adjusted R-squared 0.001425     S.D. dependent var 0.082710
S.E. of regression 0.082651     Akaike info criterion -2.138418
Sum squared resid 1.352591     Schwarz criterion -2.105435
Log likelihood 215.8418     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.125070
F-statistic 1.283891     Durbin-Watson stat 1.916304
Prob(F-statistic) 0.258547
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Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the CAPM and as explanatory 
variables the E, S and G scores (Equation 18) 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the Fama-French three factor 
model and as an explanatory variable the ESG scores (Equation 14) 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ALPHA_CAPM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/31/19   Time: 22:01
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.078603 0.052265 1.503950 0.1342
E_SCORES 0.000261 0.000513 0.508720 0.6115
S_SCORES -0.001116 0.000639 -1.746791 0.0822
G_SCORES -0.000469 0.000808 -0.580556 0.5622
R-squared 0.021858     Mean dependent var -0.000266
Adjusted R-squared 0.006887     S.D. dependent var 0.082710
S.E. of regression 0.082425     Akaike info criterion -2.134055
Sum squared resid 1.331605     Schwarz criterion -2.068089
Log likelihood 217.4055     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.107360
F-statistic 1.459972     Durbin-Watson stat 1.929716
Prob(F-statistic) 0.226757
Dependent Variable: ALPHA_FF
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:08
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.073680 0.038274 1.925085 0.0557
ESG_SCORES -0.001175 0.000617 -1.905338 0.0582
R-squared 0.018005     Mean dependent var 0.001391
Adjusted R-squared 0.013045     S.D. dependent var 0.071728
S.E. of regression 0.071259     Akaike info criterion -2.435044
Sum squared resid 1.005411     Schwarz criterion -2.402061
Log likelihood 245.5044     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.421697
F-statistic 3.630314     Durbin-Watson stat 1.941346
Prob(F-statistic) 0.058185
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Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the Fama-French three factor 
model and as an explanatory variable the E scores (Equation 15) 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the Fama-French three factor 
model and as an explanatory variable the S scores (Equation 16) 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ALPHA_FF
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:09
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.029037 0.025890 1.121539 0.2634
E_SCORES -0.000430 0.000395 -1.088911 0.2775
R-squared 0.005953     Mean dependent var 0.001391
Adjusted R-squared 0.000932     S.D. dependent var 0.071728
S.E. of regression 0.071695     Akaike info criterion -2.422846
Sum squared resid 1.017750     Schwarz criterion -2.389863
Log likelihood 244.2846     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.409498
F-statistic 1.185726     Durbin-Watson stat 1.940536
Prob(F-statistic) 0.277517
Dependent Variable: ALPHA_FF
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:10
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.048921 0.028878 1.694069 0.0918
S_SCORES -0.000802 0.000480 -1.671669 0.0962
R-squared 0.013917     Mean dependent var 0.001391
Adjusted R-squared 0.008937     S.D. dependent var 0.071728
S.E. of regression 0.071407     Akaike info criterion -2.430890
Sum squared resid 1.009596     Schwarz criterion -2.397907
Log likelihood 245.0890     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.417543
F-statistic 2.794477     Durbin-Watson stat 1.979347
Prob(F-statistic) 0.096169
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Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the Fama-French three factor 
model and as an explanatory variable the G scores (Equation 17) 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the alphas derived from the Fama-French three factor 
model and as explanatory variables the E, S and G scores (Equation 18) 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ALPHA_FF
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:11
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.054525 0.041561 1.311925 0.1911
G_SCORES -0.000844 0.000655 -1.288063 0.1992
R-squared 0.008310     Mean dependent var 0.001391
Adjusted R-squared 0.003301     S.D. dependent var 0.071728
S.E. of regression 0.071610     Akaike info criterion -2.425220
Sum squared resid 1.015337     Schwarz criterion -2.392237
Log likelihood 244.5220     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.411872
F-statistic 1.659107     Durbin-Watson stat 1.984899
Prob(F-statistic) 0.199227
Dependent Variable: ALPHA_FF
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 11:12
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.077754 0.045430 1.711528 0.0886
E_SCORES -0.000124 0.000446 -0.277188 0.7819
S_SCORES -0.000610 0.000555 -1.098113 0.2735
G_SCORES -0.000513 0.000702 -0.730452 0.4660
R-squared 0.017339     Mean dependent var 0.001391
Adjusted R-squared 0.002298     S.D. dependent var 0.071728
S.E. of regression 0.071646     Akaike info criterion -2.414366
Sum squared resid 1.006093     Schwarz criterion -2.348400
Log likelihood 245.4366     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.387671
F-statistic 1.152779     Durbin-Watson stat 1.968854
Prob(F-statistic) 0.329039
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Appendix 8: Example of the Fama-French four-factor time-series regressions’ results 
obtained for a given company (Abbott Laboratories) 
 
ESG fourth factor (Equation 19) 
 
 
 
 
 
E fourth factor (Equation 20) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: EXCESS_RET_AL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/22/19   Time: 22:05
Sample: 1 251
Included observations: 251
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.098932 0.052455 1.886041 0.0605
RM_RF__251_OBSERVATIONS_ 0.999456 0.052092 19.18638 0.0000
SMB__251_OBSERVATIONS_ -0.311213 0.102455 -3.037554 0.0026
HML__251_OBSERVATIONS_ -0.237267 0.103347 -2.295828 0.0225
ESG_FACTOR__251_OBSERVATIONS_ 0.143931 0.109638 1.312791 0.1905
R-squared 0.665479     Mean dependent var 0.097335
Adjusted R-squared 0.660040     S.D. dependent var 1.413482
S.E. of regression 0.824146     Akaike info criterion 2.470782
Sum squared resid 167.0875     Schwarz criterion 2.541010
Log likelihood -305.0832     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.499044
F-statistic 122.3450     Durbin-Watson stat 1.833391
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: EXCESS_RET_ABBOTT
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/20/19   Time: 17:56
Sample: 1 251
Included observations: 251
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.106540 0.052660 2.023165 0.0441
RM_RF__251_OBSERVATIONS_ 0.983289 0.054402 18.07454 0.0000
SMB__251_OBSERVATIONS_ -0.290889 0.104506 -2.783473 0.0058
HML__251_OBSERVATIONS_ -0.270101 0.104383 -2.587607 0.0102
E_FACTOR__251_OBERVATIONS_ -0.061178 0.121447 -0.503740 0.6149
R-squared 0.663483     Mean dependent var 0.097335
Adjusted R-squared 0.658011     S.D. dependent var 1.413482
S.E. of regression 0.826602     Akaike info criterion 2.476732
Sum squared resid 168.0846     Schwarz criterion 2.546961
Log likelihood -305.8299     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.504994
F-statistic 121.2543     Durbin-Watson stat 1.825890
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
123 
 
S fourth factor (Equation 21) 
 
 
 
 
 
G fourth factor (Equation 22) 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: EXCESS_RET_ABBOTT
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/20/19   Time: 17:57
Sample: 1 251
Included observations: 251
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.097383 0.052198 1.865660 0.0633
RM_RF__251_OBSERVATIONS_ 0.976083 0.052124 18.72624 0.0000
SMB__251_OBSERVATIONS_ -0.311604 0.101881 -3.058507 0.0025
HML__251_OBSERVATIONS_ -0.201556 0.105765 -1.905700 0.0579
S_FACTOR__251_OBSERVATIONS_ 0.194931 0.099761 1.953982 0.0518
R-squared 0.668284     Mean dependent var 0.097335
Adjusted R-squared 0.662890     S.D. dependent var 1.413482
S.E. of regression 0.820684     Akaike info criterion 2.462362
Sum squared resid 165.6865     Schwarz criterion 2.532590
Log likelihood -304.0265     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.490624
F-statistic 123.8995     Durbin-Watson stat 1.845647
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: EXCESS_RET_ABBOTT
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/20/19   Time: 17:57
Sample: 1 251
Included observations: 251
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.101434 0.052421 1.934973 0.0541
RM_RF__251_OBSERVATIONS_ 0.946885 0.066188 14.30610 0.0000
SMB__251_OBSERVATIONS_ -0.318179 0.103478 -3.074858 0.0023
HML__251_OBSERVATIONS_ -0.241487 0.103410 -2.335227 0.0203
G_FACTOR__251_OBSERVATIONS_ 0.093890 0.086687 1.083095 0.2798
R-squared 0.664734     Mean dependent var 0.097335
Adjusted R-squared 0.659283     S.D. dependent var 1.413482
S.E. of regression 0.825063     Akaike info criterion 2.473006
Sum squared resid 167.4595     Schwarz criterion 2.543234
Log likelihood -305.3623     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.501268
F-statistic 121.9366     Durbin-Watson stat 1.832314
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Appendix 9: Tables of the cross-sectional regressions having as a dependent variable 
the average annual returns for the year 2018 and, as independent variables, the 
estimated market factor, SMB factor, HML factor and sustainable factor 
 
Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the Ri 2018 and as explanatory variables the estimated 
betas related to Rm-Rf, SMB, HML and ESG (Equation 23) 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the Ri 2018 and as explanatory variables the estimated 
betas related to Rm-Rf, SMB, HML and ESG (Equation 24) 
 
Dependent Variable: AVERAGE_ANNUAL_RETURNS
Method: Least Squares
Date: 04/01/19   Time: 13:41
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.005062 0.017356 -0.291660 0.7709
BETA_RELATED_TO_RM_RF -0.004689 0.016751 -0.279933 0.7798
BETA_RELATED_TO_SMB -0.028861 0.021092 -1.368343 0.1728
BETA_RELATED_TO_HML -0.067131 0.008368 -8.022654 0.0000
BETA_RELATED_TO_ESG 0.057837 0.011552 5.006473 0.0000
R-squared 0.336920     Mean dependent var -0.013217
Adjusted R-squared 0.323318     S.D. dependent var 0.079354
S.E. of regression 0.065277     Akaike info criterion -2.595666
Sum squared resid 0.830917     Schwarz criterion -2.513208
Log likelihood 264.5666     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.562296
F-statistic 24.77051     Durbin-Watson stat 2.087483
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: RI_2018
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/23/19   Time: 10:34
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.026341 0.019342 -1.361841 0.1748
RM_RF_E_FACTOR 0.009712 0.018216 0.533157 0.5945
SMB_E_FACTOR -0.046246 0.022142 -2.088630 0.0380
HML_E_FACTOR -0.067065 0.008515 -7.875726 0.0000
E_FACTOR 0.046097 0.012114 3.805235 0.0002
R-squared 0.315628     Mean dependent var -0.013217
Adjusted R-squared 0.301590     S.D. dependent var 0.079354
S.E. of regression 0.066317     Akaike info criterion -2.564061
Sum squared resid 0.857597     Schwarz criterion -2.481603
Log likelihood 261.4061     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.530691
F-statistic 22.48322     Durbin-Watson stat 2.022980
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the Ri 2018 and as explanatory variables the estimated 
betas related to Rm-Rf, SMB, HML and ESG (Equation 25) 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-sectional regression having as a dependent variable the Ri 2018 and as explanatory variables the estimated 
betas related to Rm-Rf, SMB, HML and ESG (Equation 26) 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: RI_2018
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/23/19   Time: 10:36
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.010910 0.017521 0.622715 0.5342
RM_RF_S -0.022650 0.016831 -1.345699 0.1800
SMB_S -0.024571 0.021185 -1.159825 0.2475
HML_S_FACTOR -0.068238 0.008409 -8.114814 0.0000
S_FACTOR 0.063062 0.012189 5.173739 0.0000
R-squared 0.330875     Mean dependent var -0.013217
Adjusted R-squared 0.317150     S.D. dependent var 0.079354
S.E. of regression 0.065574     Akaike info criterion -2.586591
Sum squared resid 0.838491     Schwarz criterion -2.504133
Log likelihood 263.6591     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.553222
F-statistic 24.10637     Durbin-Watson stat 2.069499
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: RI_2018
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/23/19   Time: 10:37
Sample: 1 200
Included observations: 200
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.037827 0.025250 1.498090 0.1357
RM_RF_G_FACTOR -0.050232 0.024792 -2.026111 0.0441
SMB_G_FACTOR -0.030721 0.021896 -1.403051 0.1622
HML_G_FACTOR -0.068093 0.008678 -7.846729 0.0000
G_FACTOR 0.019953 0.011386 1.752373 0.0813
R-squared 0.289768     Mean dependent var -0.013217
Adjusted R-squared 0.275200     S.D. dependent var 0.079354
S.E. of regression 0.067558     Akaike info criterion -2.526971
Sum squared resid 0.890003     Schwarz criterion -2.444513
Log likelihood 257.6971     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.493601
F-statistic 19.88958     Durbin-Watson stat 2.039416
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Appendix 10: Correlation tables related to estimated risk factors used in equations 23, 
24, 25 and 26 
 
Correlation table 31 included my estimated ESG risk factor  
 ß̂im ß̂is ß̂ih ß̂iESG 
ß̂im 1    
ß̂is 0.46280899 1   
ß̂ih -0.0732366 0.14027362 1  
ß̂iESG -0.0574221 -0.1656666 0.04619515 1 
 
Correlation table 32 included my estimated E risk factor 
 ß̂im ß̂is ß̂ih ß̂iE 
ß̂im 1    
ß̂is 0.51700397 1   
ß̂ih -0.08330535 0.13190774 1  
ß̂iE -0.1287271 -0.1964914 0.09927958 1 
 
Correlation table 33 included my estimated S risk factor  
 ß̂im ß̂is ß̂ih ß̂iS 
ß̂im 1    
ß̂is 0.46172666 1   
ß̂ih -0.0580056 0.14159318 1  
ß̂iS 0.02711767 -0.0648115 0.10027612 1 
 
Correlation table 34 included my estimated G risk factor 
 ß̂im ß̂is ß̂ih ß̂iG 
ß̂im 1    
ß̂is 0.28475515 1   
ß̂ih 0.03480685 0.21382246 1  
ß̂iG 0.20391491 0.09305277 0.04464959 1 
 
 
 
 
 
